Message from the Administrator

Excerpts from a statement by Francis M. Mullen, Jr. before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, April 21, 1982.

Francis M. Mullen, Jr.
Acting Administrator

Illicit drugs and narcotics profits have a devastating effect on our society and economy. Illicit drugs generated an estimated $79 billion in retail sales in the United States during 1980, up 22 percent from 1979. The enormous profits available make drug trafficking an attractive venture, which some people believe is worth the risks inherent in such an illegal enterprise. We must increase those risks. It is time for drug traffickers to face stiffer penalties for their actions.

The United States has worked in cooperation with foreign countries to bring about a reduction in drug cultivation, processing and trafficking. We have had numerous successes ranging from the recent curtailment of methaqualone production in Western Europe to Colombia's recent operation to interdict large shipments of marihuana and cocaine destined for the Southeastern United States.

The capability of the United States military will be an important asset in future operations. The recent removal of the amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which will enable our government to provide assistance to foreign eradication efforts, will provide additional weapons with which to combat the problem. The President's South Florida Task Force has only been in operation for a month, but already is having an impact on cocaine and marihuana availability in Florida. This is a tremendous start, and the future is promising.

Recently, the Attorney General chaired the first meeting of the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy. The Council was created to address the problems associated with narcotics, immigration and other legal policy issues which will require interdepartmental and interagency action. This initial meeting was devoted solely to drug supply reduction issues and was a positive step toward ensuring that the Federal Government has a coordinated and comprehensive program dedicated to controlling drug trafficking.

We have re-examined DEA's operations, reorganized many programs and with the support of the FBI are targeting additional resources against drug trafficking. But to effectively persuade foreign governments to act on drug control, the Federal Government must combine a convincing domestic program with a consistent diplomatic program. Strong coordination must be enhanced to ensure that all aspects of United States policy support our drug control interests overseas and we are aggressively moving forward in this area.

I am optimistic that with your support significant inroads are being made and will continue in the year ahead.

Drug Enforcement

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Washington, D.C. 20537

Francis M. Mullen, Jr.
Acting Administrator

W. Gordon Fink
Deputy Assistant Administrator
Office of Congressional and Public Affairs

Horton Heath, Jr.—Editor
Elizabeth D. Nichols—Art Director
Carolyn M. Bronson—Staff Assistant
John J. Boyle—Photographer

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READEX FICHE

Drug Traffic Today — Challenge and Response

Excerpts from a report to the President's Cabinet Council on Legal Policy, March 24, 1982.

William French Smith
Attorney General of the United States

Drug trafficking is a major cause of violence and crime going far beyond the injurious health consequences to the individual.

All of the heroin and cocaine, most of the marihuana, and a portion of the illicit dangerous drugs consumed in the United States and Europe are cultivated, processed and trafficked through Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, South America and the Caribbean. International politics and economics in these areas often hinge on the balance of power and trade that is controlled by "narco-dollars." This affects international relations and has serious implications for our foreign policy development.

In the United States, there are cocaine wars in the streets of Miami, New York and Los Angeles; United States drug agents are shot execution style in South America. Traditional organized crime syndicates have reemerged in the trafficking of heroin from several

President Ronald Reagan with Attorney General Smith at luncheon on March 24.

sources to the United States. The Armed Forces are compelled to implement extensive drug treatment and rehabilitation programs because of the high levels of drug abuse among their personnel. Although use of marihuana among high school seniors is declining or stabilized, America has one of the highest teenage drug abuse rates among industrial nations. Marihuana has become a significant commercial cash crop in several states. Drug money has wreaked havoc with the economy in South Florida.

The money is awesome. It is estimated that in 1980 the retail, street-level transaction value of the drug trade just in the United States was about *$79 billion,* which is up 22 percent from the preceding year and continuing to escalate. By way of comparison, the annual volume of sales of the five largest business corporations in the United States in 1980 ranged from a high of $103 billion (Exxon) to $40 billion (Standard Oil of California). In other words, the drug business would be ranked second on this index. The profit motive for the traffickers is powerful and compelling.

Heroin retail sales generated over *$8 billion* in 1980. Far more important, however, are the health consequences. Although the level of domestic heroin abuse is less severe than the extreme experienced in 1976, heroin availability

Heroin Importation

and abuse again have been on the increase since mid-1979. From 1979 to 1980 heroin-related injuries rose 25 percent, from 9,700 to 12,900. There were over 850 heroin-related deaths in 1980, a 20 percent increase from 1979. The national addict population is thought to be approximately 450,000, primarily in the 26-39 age group. As a point of emphasis, one study of 243 addicts estimated they committed one-half million crimes in 11 years.

An estimated 4 metric tons of heroin were smuggled into the U.S. in 1980, up 7 percent from 1979. About 60 percent was refined from opium cultivated in Southwest Asia—Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. In 1980, Mexico was the source for 25 percent of the U.S. heroin, which is in sharp contrast to four years earlier (1976), when Mexican heroin accounted for over two-thirds of the U.S. market. This reduction is a direct consequence of the Mexican Government's aggressive opium poppy eradication campaign. The balance comes from the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia—Burma, Northern Thailand and Laos. This region suffered two successive droughts, greatly diminishing opium production from 1978 through 1980. There was a bumper crop in 1981, and production will provide enough heroin to glut the world market.

The magnitude of the abuse and misuse of dangerous drugs is much more severe than for heroin, causing almost seven times as many injuries and almost twice as many deaths as heroin. This category includes stimulants, such as amphetamines and methamphetamines; depressants, such as methaqualone and the barbiturates; and hallucinogenics, notably PCP and LSD. Dangerous drug abuse affects millions in the United States' general population, young and old alike.

Dangerous drugs, entering the illicit market from clandestine manufacture or diversion from legitimate domestic or international sources, generated an estimated *$17 billion* in U.S. retail sales in 1980. This traffic finances organized criminal activities, including traditional organized crime in the Northeast, Colombian methaqualone traffickers in the Southeast, and outlaw motorcycle gangs all across the country who, among others, are responsible for the clandestine manufacture of dangerous drugs. These groups, in particular, are responsible for high levels of violence associated with their activities. In addition, it is estimated that approximately 275 million dosage units are diverted from legitimate U.S. manufacturing and distribution channels as a result of theft, burglaries, highjackings and fraudulent prescribing and dispensing practices.

Over the last five years, cocaine indicators have shown the highest consistent growth for any drug category. Although it is difficult to

Cocaine Importation



South America 100%

track cocaine-related injuries and deaths from the data available, nationwide increases in both instances have become apparent. In 1980, there were over 3,100 reported cocaine-related injuries, up over 40 percent from the previous year. Preliminary data indicates that in that same time frame cocaine-related deaths increased from approximately 65 percent to over 70. Federal cocaine arrests and seizures show dramatic increases.

Availability seems to be a major generative factor in the growth of cocaine abuse. Unfortunately, ample supplies of coca and cocaine are expected to be available for the international market for the next several years. The total smuggled into the United States in 1980 approximated 44 metric tons, an increase of about 57 percent from 1979. Cocaine is the top illicit drug income producer, generating an estimated *$29 billion* in retail sales in 1980.

For the most part, coca cultivation is well established, and controlled to varying degrees in Peru and Bolivia. About 20 to 30 percent of the leaf production is licitly grown for world pharmaceutical needs and for indigenous use. The rest of the coca leaf is processed into cocaine and is transshipped to the U.S. by private and commercial aircraft, stopping most often in Central America or the Caribbean to refuel.

The cocaine traffic has the most severe socio-economic consequences of all drugs. Competition for the market is unusually intense and violent, even by drug trafficking standards. Currently, about 12-15 major Colombian families and associates dominate the trade. The vast profits corrupt society and the economy all along the production and distribution chain.

Marihuana traffic also generates tremendous profits—in 1980 street-level sales in the United States were valued at an estimated *$24 billion.* South America is also the source for the vast majority of the marihuana consumed in the United States; about 75 percent of the marihuana imported in the U.S.—between 7,700 and 11,300 metric tons—comes from Colombia. The State Department estimates that in 1980 Colombian illicit drug exports (including marihuana, cocaine and methaqualone) were between $1.6 billion and $4 billion. By comparison, their coffee exports for 1980 were $1.8 billion. (Coffee is their major export item.)

Marihuana production in Jamaica, although vastly smaller than Colombia's, has been expanding rapidly over the past three years. The American Embassy in Jamaica estimates that marihuana production accounts for approximately one-quarter of that country's Gross Domestic Product and generates more foreign exchange than the combined total value of their major exports, alumina/bauxite and sugar, and tourism.

Sources of Marihuana



Although Mexico is still a major source country for marihuana destined for the United States, its share of the overall U.S. market has declined rapidly in the past several years—from 18 percent in 1978 to 8 percent in 1980. This shift developed as the Government of Mexico embarked on an eradication program with the herbicide paraquat, which in turn forced marihuana users to turn elsewhere.

The situation has ultimately led to the establishment of scattered domestic production of the marihuana type known as sinsemilla (Sp., without seeds). Domestic commercial cultivation has consistently represented about 7 percent of the total marihuana consumed in the United States. These ventures are concentrated in seven primary states—California, Hawaii, Oregon, Arkansas, Missouri, Kentucky, and Florida. Although the scattered distribution makes it unlikely that much of this cultivation is marketed far from where it is grown, it still represents a major enterprise. The chief agricultural agent in Mendocino County, California (one of four significant Northern California sinsemilla-growing counties), estimates that marihuana is the state's largest cash crop, worth over $1 billion annually.

The demand for this marihuana, although it has leveled off since the peak in 1978, remains high. About 12 percent of the total U.S. population are considered to be regular marihuana users. Research is consistently showing that marihuana use is dangerous, especially when used while driving or operating machinery or by teenagers and young adults during a time of rapid physiological and psychological change. After careful study, the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine recently concluded that marihuana is far from innocuous and its use "justifies serious national concern."

The Justice Department is committed to controlling this awesome drug situation. While controlling the drug at the source is an effective strategy, there are several other areas more within the control of the law enforcment sector.

Structurally, the reporting relationship for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has been changed to give the Director of the FBI general supervision over drug law enforcement. This will achieve a significantly higher degree of coordination and effectiveness in our efforts. The DEA has also been reorganized to centralize management for improved efficiency. Overall, these efforts will bolster the results that can be achieved from our limited resources. Since 1976 almost 1,000 DEA and FBI Special Agents—about 9 percent of our agent work force—have been lost through the budget process.

The FBI has been given concur-

rent jurisdictional powers to conduct drug investigations, adding a new dimension to investigations targetted at organizations engaged in a wide range of criminal activity.

Also, the Department of Justice has been working with Congress to develop legislative remedies to certain detrimental situations. Legislation has been introduced to strengthen Federal bail and sentencing provisions and amend the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts and the Tax Reform Act of 1976 which makes drug-related financial investigations unreasonably difficult.

During the first session of the 97th Congress, two major proposals were enacted. The Foreign Assistance Act prohibition against foreign aid for the use of herbicidal eradication of marihuana was repealed, demonstrating to source nation counterparts that the United States is committed to eradication and control of the drugs at the source. To facilitate meaningful Federal involvement in foreign and domestic herbicidal eradication programs, some regulations need to be modified. Legislation to provide for the Federal forfeiture of the land upon which the marihuana is grown should also be explored.

Significantly, the restrictions on military assistance to civilian law enforcement as codified in the Posse Comitatus statute were rescinded. The Department of Justice and the Defense community are now engaged in active dialogue to determine how best to involve military resources. Rapid progress is needed in this area.

The Federal Government has been supporting the state and local effort to control the proliferation of drug paraphernalia outlets by providing counsel and model legislation drafted by DEA. Two Supreme Court actions this month have affirmed the constitutionality of state statutes based on the Model Drug



Source: *Crime in the U.S., Uniform Crime Reports*, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1960-1980. (Note: The figures represented above have not been adjusted for increases in the number of drug-offense statutes or the number of entities reporting to UCR during the period.)

Paraphernalia Act.

Operationaliy, a coordinated drug control program can work. The line was held on heroin. The continued abundance of Southwest Asian heroin led to forecasts of an epidemic increase in our addict population. However, investigations directed at the upper echelons of the trafficking networks were successful and the addict population increase has been less than anticipated.

The Southeastern United States and the Caribbean basin have been the scene of numerous multi-agency operations directed against the most significant cocaine and marihuana trafficking organizations. Operations Grouper, Tiburon, Bancoshares, and Greenback were all special large-scale investigations involving the coordinated operations of the DEA, FBI, Customs Service, IRS and state and local agencies. These resulted in the indictment and arrest of hundreds of significant defendants and multi-million dollar seizures of assets.

Overall, asset seizures of major drug violators have increased substantially. In the past two years alone, DEA seized approximately $255 million in drug-related assets —currency and property such as real estate and vehicles. Seizures this year are expected to exceed the total dollar amount of the DEA budget.

International cooperation has been enhanced; as a result, major trafficking organizations have been disrupted and immobilized. For example, the recent activity and success by the Government of Thailand in destroying the heroin conversion laboratories and staging areas of the Shan United Army on the Thai-Burma border is directly related to the persistent efforts of the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters.

DEA's foreign compliance program focused on restricting large-scale diversion of pharmaceuticals in international commerce has been successful. As a direct response to diplomatic initiatives, two major source countries, Austria and Hungary, agreed to curtail methaqualone production and the Federal Republic of Germany, a major transit country, imposed stringent import/export control measures on the drug.

The interagency intelligence effort at the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) has brought the law enforcement community together to cooperatively work on drug cases, ensuring that the full scope of issues is addressed in each major investigation. This is a resource that has much potential and steps are being taken to improve and broaden its utilization.

Dealers, Dollars and Drugs

Drug Law Enforcement's Promising New Three-Dimensional Program

Harry L. Myers
Assistant Chief Counsel
Drug Enforcement Administration
and
Joseph P. Brzostowski
Special Agent
Financial Investigative Section
Drug Enforcement Administration

NEW YORK—Federal agents arrest twelve drug traffickers; seize 11,600 pounds of hashish, 1.5 pounds of Thai sticks and 5,000 units of LSD; and confiscate $400,000 in cash, a painting valued at $1,000,000, gold and jewelry worth $100,000 and a Mercedes Benz. . .

SAN FRANCISCO—Federal agents arrest two drug traffickers, seize 23.5 pounds of cocaine, and confiscate a bank account containing $212,000, stocks worth $15,000 and a mansion on an estate valued at $750,000. . .

MIAMI—Federal agents arrest one of the biggest financiers of drug trafficking in the United States, seize 44 pounds of pure cocaine, confiscate $1,000,000 in cash and notify Swiss authorities to freeze the drug dealer's secret bank accounts. . .

News like this is all too common in America. Every day we hear reports of more drug arrests and more drug seizures. Yet something about these three reports is different. An important new dimension has been added to the drug enforcement picture they describe: Money! Law enforcement has begun to seize the profits of crime.

Stalking $80 Billion

Drug trafficking is big business. It is organized to earn huge profits. Each year Americans spend almost $80 billion to buy illicit drugs. The statistics are staggering. Like all other businesses, drug trafficking organizations have three elements:

- Workers and managers;
- Products and services;
- Money and other assets.

Historically, we have attacked criminal businesses by arresting and punishing their workers and managers. And we have attacked them by seizing their illegal products, such as narcotics and other dangerous drugs. But we have ignored their third dimension. For too long we did not attack the money, property or assets of these illegal companies.

"It seems probable that drug law enforcement will eventually pay its own way."

All businesses need money and property to create products, to deliver them to their customers, to promote sales and to grow. Criminal businesses are no different. Drug dealers need money and property to produce and market their contraband goods. They need money to buy silence from witnesses, to pay bribes, to expand into other illegal activities, to move into new towns and cities, to seduce more citizens into joining their ranks, and to pay for all their other illegal expenses.

Money and property are at the heart of all businesses. As long as assets and profits go untouched, lost workers and lost products can always be quickly replaced. Even with leaders in jail, confederates continue the dangerous and deadly business of drug trafficking by using the wealth and property left behind. And those imprisoned quickly return to drug dealing after being released, because criminals making huge profits see jail as an acceptable risk as long as they get to keep their earnings. They can invest their illegal fortunes while in jail, and the money will be waiting for them, with interest, when they get out.

The Drug Enforcement Administration is implementing an enforcement program that strikes at all three dimensions of drug trafficking. We are continuing to improve upon our traditional objectives of arresting major dealers and seizing large amounts of drugs. But, as the reports at the beginning of this article indicate, we are now seizing the ill-gotten profits and property of these criminals.

Today's drug agents can no longer confine themselves to the "who, what, where, when and why" of drugs and drug dealers. During every phase of their investigations they must now ask: "What about the dollars?" If we are ever to be successful against drug traffickers, we must raid their treasuries, we must confiscate their ill-gotten wealth.

The Power of Forfeiture

The power to confiscate the financial resources of criminals exists in the ancient Law of Forfeiture. Since the days of Moses civilizations throughout the world have recognized the inherent right of government to confiscate, or "forfeit," anything used illegally, acquired illegally or dangerous to society.[1] Government does not pay for forfeitable property; it is simply confiscated and disposed of. While this may seem harsh, American courts have repeatedly upheld it as constitutional.[2] The power of forfeiture was approved and practiced by the American Colonies.[3] It was used by the First Congress of the United States to confiscate pirate ships, smuggling ships and slave ships.[4] Hundreds of forfeiture laws are now enforced by both the Federal Government and the states.

The first use of the forfeiture power to confiscate the profits and other assets of drug dealers occurred in 1970. Persons convicted of operating large drug-trafficking organizations, in violation of the Federal Controlled Substances Act, were required to forfeit: all their illegally acquired profits, all their capital in the illegal business, and all their other property that helped them operate illegally.[5] Forfeiture of this property was made a part of the punishment for the crime. A similar (but not identical) provision, designed to forfeit the assets of all convicted organized criminals, was passed, at the same time, in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.[6]

Despite the best efforts of agents and prosecutors, relatively little was seized from drug dealers under these criminal forfeiture laws.[7] Congress reacted in 1978 with a bold new approach. It passed a civil law declaring that all moneys used in, and all assets acquired from, the illicit drug trade belong to the United States Government and are subject to civil seizure under the forfeiture power.[8] In effect, Congress authorized federal attorneys to file civil lawsuits asserting the Government's right to such property. Although the same evidence gathered in a criminal investigation can be used in these civil suits, they are independent of any criminal trials.[9] Dismissal of criminal charges against an owner due to some technicality does not prevent the Government from civilly suing for return of the property.[10] Civil forfeiture suits are

not burdened by the complex procedures followed in criminal cases.[11] The level of proof needed in civil forfeiture suits is significantly less than the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" required in criminal trials.[12] And the Government can introduce more kinds of evidence in these civil cases.[13]

Results under the 1978 civil forfeiture law have been impressive. In 1979, the first full year of implementing the law, DEA alone seized $9.8 million in assets. In 1980, DEA civilly seized $34.5 million in assets. And in 1981 DEA civilly seized $54.4 million in assets. Seizures made by other agencies based upon information and assistance provided by DEA amounted to $154.2 million. DEA seizures of drug-related assets under the 1970 criminal statutes totaled $14.75 million for this same period. In all, DEA agents captured $268 million from drug dealers in just three years.

This is only the beginning. It takes time—a long time—to educate thousands of agents, prosecutors and judges in the intricacies of new laws. As the educational process on forfeiture continues, the dollar value and the variety of assets seized should dramatically increase. It seems probable that drug law enforcement will eventually pay its own way. We should reach a point where the costs to taxpayers will be offset by the fortunes seized from drug dealers. Although the federal program is still in its infancy, it is already producing vast amounts of revenue.

While all states arrest drug dealers and seize drugs, fewer than ten states seize drug profits. Most have neglected to pass laws attacking the finances of drug traffickers. To help correct this, DEA has developed a Model Act based upon the 1978 federal forfeiture law. It consists of an amendment to the civil forfeiture section of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, now enforced in forty-seven states.[14]

Model Forfeiture of Drug Profits Act

SECTION (insert designation of the civil forfeiture section) of the Controlled Substances Act of this State is amended by adding the following paragraph after paragraph (insert designation of the last category of forfeitable property):

( ) Everything of value furnished, or intended to be furnished, in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this Act (meaning the Controlled Substances Act of this State), all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used, or intended to be used, to facilitate any violation of this Act; except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by him to have been committed or omitted without his knowledge or consent.

Rebuttable Presumption: All moneys, coin and currency found in close proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, to forfeitable drug manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia, or to forfeitable records of the importation, manufacture or distribution of controlled substances, are presumed to be forfeitable under this paragraph. The burden of proof is upon claimants of the property to rebut this presumption.

Put simply, this Model Act would permit states to seize, civilly forfeit, and deposit in their treasuries:

1. All moneys and other property used to buy contraband drugs,
2. All property bought with the profits from drug dealing, and
3. All moneys used to facilitate any drug law violation.

States adopting this provision should seriously consider allocating the moneys forfeited under it to the drug enforcement, education, prevention and treatment agencies within their jurisdictions. Variations in state finance laws preclude drafting a model provision dedicating forfeited property. Nevertheless, every state should amend its laws to devote a substantial portion of forfeited drug profits to the fight against drug abuse.

Drug Agents' Guide to Forfeiture of Assets

Until recently, the Law of Forfeiture played a very insignificant role in our struggle with crime. Although it is a well-established legal doctrine, up to now it has been ignored by most legal scholars. No books have been written on forfeiture law. No schools offer courses in forfeiture. Few legal experts exist in the area. Only a relative handful of police, lawyers and citizens are even aware of the concept.

As a result, states adopting the Model Forfeiture of Drug Profits Act will face the immediate challenge of educating their officials in this area. Fortunately, DEA has just completed a training manual on forfeiture. The text, entitled the **Drug Agents' Guide to Forfeiture of Assets,** is approximately 400 pages long and contains over 800 citations to state and federal forfeiture cases. The first seven chapters explain all aspects of civil forfeiture law, including a comprehensive analysis of the 1978 federal law on which the Model Forfeiture of Drug Profits Act is based. The eighth chapter discusses criminal forfeiture law, including the provisions of both the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Offense of the Federal Controlled Substances Act. The ninth chapter probes the practical problems facing agents investigating cases involving substantial drug-related assets. And the tenth chapter contains the Model Forfeiture of Drug Profits Act, with a Prefatory Note and Comment.

The guide is available through the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. At present, it sells for $9.50, which includes postage and handling. The GPO Stock Number is 027-004-00034-2.

Conclusion

Thanks to the Law of Forfeiture, drug agents now have the potential of seizing more money than they spend. With tax dollars becoming scarce, the Law of Forfeiture holds the promise of dramatically improving drug law enforcement while profiting the public treasuries. The long-range implications are enormous. The Drug Enforcement Administration sincerely believes that no state can afford to ignore the modern potential of this ancient legal doctrine.

Footnotes

[1] Finklestein, *The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives On Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death And The Western Notion of Sovereignty*, 46 Temple Law Quarterly 169 (1973).

[2] *Calero-Toledo* v. *Pearson Yacht Leasing Company*, 94 S.Ct. 2080 (1974).

[3] Surrency, *The Courts In The American Colonies*, 11 Am. Jour. Legal History 253 at 261 (1967).

[4] *Supra* Note 2, at 2092.

[5] 21 U.S.C. 848.

[6] 18 U.S.C. 1962, 1963.

[7] *Asset Forfeiture—A Seldom Used Tool In Combatting Drug Trafficking*, General Accounting Office, GGD-81-51, April 10, 1981.

[8] 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6).

[9] *The Palmyra*, 12 Wheat. 1, 6L.Ed. 531 (1827).

[10] *United States* v. *One Clipper Bow Ketch Nisku*, 548 F.2d 8 (1 Cir. 1977).

[11] See, e.g., *United States* v. *110 Bars of Silver*, 508 F.2d799 (5 Cir. 1975).

[12] 19 U.S.C. 1615; *One Lot of Emerald Cut Stones* v. *United States*, 93 S. Ct. 489 (1972).

[13] Rule 1101(e), Federal Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C.); See, e.g., *United States* v. *One Twin Engine Beech Airplane*, 533 F.2d 1106 (9 Cir. 1976).

[14] Volume 9, Uniform Laws Annotated, Table of Jurisdictions.

International Traffic in Methaqualone

Gene R. Haislip
Director
Office of Compliance and Regulatory Affairs

During the past several years the United States has increasingly become the victim of a new and different kind of international drug traffic based on the very best technology available. The source of the drugs in question is not the distant poppy fields, the labor of illiterate farmers, or the amateurish products of backroom laboratories but the most sophisticated chemical factories in existence. Chief among the drugs in question is methaqualone—called "Quaaludes," "sopors," "mequin," or simply "ludes." This is a synthetic sedative-type drug which can be addictive and cause grand mal seizures. Listed in Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), it is legitimately available, but the entire population of the United States consumes less than four tons annually for medical purposes. The amount available for abuse vastly exceeds this quantity and until recently the sources remained unknown.

According to the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) national report, deaths and injuries associated with methaqualone have been increasing more rapidly than any other single drug problem. The DAWN report showed 2,389 deaths and injuries in 1978, increasing to 3,368 in 1979, and finally 6,091 in 1980, for a total increase of 154 percent. In three years time it has become one of the most popular and widespread drugs of abuse across the nation and throughout society. In 1981, it was reported to be the most popular drug of choice with adolescents next to marihuana.

Since production quotas for methaqualone are strictly allocated by the Drug Enforcement Administration, the obvious question was where such enormous quantities of the drug could be coming from. In the fall of 1980, DEA officials began to take note of large seizures of loads of 1,000 or more pounds of methaqualone tablets aboard light aircraft arriving surreptitiously in the Southeastern United States from Colombia. Often these seizures resulted from local citizens' complaints to the neighborhood sheriff about the mysterious landing of an aircraft on a country road. The very nature of such incidences suggested that authorities were merely seeing the "tip of the iceberg." An analysis of these tablets by DEA's Special Testing Laboratory established three facts: first, the tablets looked like legitimate Quaalude tablets produced and distributed in the United States; second, in spite of their appearance the tablets were in fact counterfeits; and finally, in spite of the counterfeit nature of the tablets, they did contain methaqualone which had been legitimately produced somewhere.

The next problem was to determine where and how Colombian violators were obtaining such





quantities of legitimate methaqualone powder. As a result of DEA's activities, in cooperation with Colombian authorities, the answer was soon forthcoming. Even though none of the required permits had been issued for the legal importation of methaqualone, multi-ton shipments were continually arriving at Colombian airports and seaports. In some cases the shipments were properly labeled and their point of origin was immediately obvious. In other cases a conscious effort had been made by brokers or freight forwarders to disguise the nature of the goods, but shipping documents nevertheless provided a means to trace the origin. As a result of these seizures and the diplomatic initiatives which they made possible, the total picture of international diversion has been gradually assembled. As in the case of any sophisticated line of drug trafficking, the generalities used to describe it admit of many exceptions. Nevertheless, the basic "modus operandi" and the deficiencies in the fabric of international control can be broadly described.

The first major discovery was that the United States is not the only country victimized by this type of illicit drug trafficking. Other nations, in Europe, the Middle East, and more recently in Africa, have been involved in the diversion of large shipments of major drugs of abuse from international commerce in exactly the same manner as those affecting the United States. A number of controlled drugs, such as amphetamines, barbiturates and diazepam, are also subject to major diversion though perhaps to a lesser known extent than methaqualone. The underlying causes which have made this situation possible are the inherent weaknesses in national laws and the international treaties relating to such drugs. This is in sharp contrast to the general adequacy of such laws and treaties relating to narcotic drugs.

Basically, the violators, through the use of false letterheads, addresses, and perhaps forged importation documents, represent themselves to brokers in European trade zones as "legitimate" purchasers of the drug involved. The brokers in turn will place the order with a major manufacturer and arrange for necessary shipping. In this fashion, millions of dollars in potential illicit profits are obtained for thousands of dollars of investment. The goods will then move in the stream of commerce to their final destination without detection since most Customs officials are looking for different types of drugs, i.e., heroin, cocaine, and marihuana, being smuggled in an entirely different fashion.

Sometimes the scenario is more complicated. The broker may be in collusion with the violators and thereby obtain an inflated fee for his services, which may include mislabeling the goods as 'harmless chemicals," "fertilizer," or "soda ash." Even manufacturers have been approached directly for large purchases by customers carrying a suitcase filled with U.S. currency.

In a single recent investigation, Panamanian authorities working with DEA seized 9,000 kilograms of methaqualone powder. Virtually all of the powder was intended for clandestine laboratories in Colombia which are controlled by well organized and financed drug trafficking groups. The shipping route was from the Hamburg free-trade zone through Spain to Panama. The methaqualone shipment was brokered by a German firm which, in order to circumvent the existing Colombian and Panamanian import controls, knowingly and deliberately relabeled the contents as harmless chemicals.

As our investigations have intensified, similar large shipments have been discovered which were entering the United States, Canada, and

A DEA chemist shows how a Stokes tabletting press may be used to manufacture clandestine methaqualone tablets; this one is portable and can be operated with normal house current or by hand, producing up to 250 tablets a minute. As a bullet may be traced to the weapon that fired it, so the tablets may be identified with respect to their source by a ballistics examination, revealing microscopic marks made by the particular punches used in the compression process.

Mexico from Europe. Thus, although the traffic in this hemisphere has been dominated by the Colombians, it is clear that other North American criminal organizations are likewise involved.

The success of DEA's efforts is reflected in the sharp increase in seizures which has occurred. In 1980, prior to the initiation of this program, a total of 13 tons of methaqualone in or destined for the United States illicit traffic was seized. Much of this, as previously indicated, was the result of untargeted enforcement activity. In 1981, a total of 58 tons was seized, nearly all of which resulted from targeted investigations involving the drug enforcement authorities of several nations working in concert.

These seizures and the arrest of principal violators responsible for organizing the traffic are the result of diplomatic initiatives undertaken by DEA's Office of Diversion Control with the assistance of the State Department. The basic strategy has employed a cycle of activities in which intelligence collection, diplomacy, operations, and international cooperation have been merged. First, intelligence derived from arrests and seizures has provided the basis for diplomatic discussions. These, in turn, have resulted in the increased flow of operational intelligence, making further arrests and seizures possible. The result is the creation of yet more knowledge on which to base further diplomatic initiatives. The effort has involved the active cooperation of a number of governments, especially the Federal Republic of Germany, the People's Republic of Hungary, Austria, Mexico, Colombia, Canada, Panama, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and others. In addition to the seizures, three major European producers have curtailed their methaqualone production upon realizing the ultimate abuse to which the product has been put.

The evidence suggests that the backbone of the Colombian methaqualone traffic has been broken. Because of reduced production it will be impossible for violators to restore it to previous levels. Nevertheless, other important sources remain to be effectively dealt with and are the focus of further activity. But methaqualone is not the only major example of diversion from international commerce. Significant traffic in diverted amphetamine powder from Europe into Mexico and then into the United States has been well documented. African and Asian countries are also current victims of this trade. Diversion of barbiturates has occurred in this fashion and several instances of the use of pentazocine to counterfeit Dilaudid tablets have occurred. More recently, there has been a growing pattern of diazepam (Valium) diversion from European sources through Canada and Colombia for the purpose of manufacturing counterfeit Quaaludes. Customarily, these counterfeit tablets will contain from 4 to 20 times the amount of diazepam used in a standard dosage unit of Valium.

The crux of the problem is the failure of law to provide adequate controls over these huge categories of dangerous drugs. The nations responsible for their manufacture have not generally grasped the significance of the threat which they pose to the international community. Thus, the finest chemical technology which science can devise is being put to work to make billions of dollars of profit for criminals, causing further billions of dollars of injury to individuals in exchange for the modest return to the legitimate enterprises involved. It is a case of nations injuring themselves and their neighbors through ignorance. But the attack on the trade in methaqualone has proved that the means do exist to remedy the problem.

"Operation Florida"

Excerpts from an address by Vice President Bush, chairman of a cabinet-level task force to coordinate federal efforts against crime in South Florida, before the Miami Citizens Against Crime on February 16, 1982.

To those who commit crime, who engage in violence, we say, the American people have great patience, but that patience has been sapped. South Florida cannot be a haven for criminals, for drug traffickers, for hired assassins.

During the past two weeks, we have been working long hours in trying to determine what can be done in the immediate short-term and in the long run to help solve problems related to the Task Force —especially the problem of crime. I would like to list today a number of decisions that have been made in a very short time to launch our effort. Others will be forthcoming in the weeks and months ahead.

Here are the problems relating to crime, as we see them, based on information provided us by law enforcement officials and responsible civilians representing various organizations here in the area.

- Insufficient jail space;
- Insufficient courtrooms;
- An insufficient number of judges;
- No permanent U.S. Attorney and 18 vacancies for assistant U.S. Attorneys;
- Insufficient manpower in all law enforcement agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration; the FBI; Customs; Immigration; Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; and perhaps the Internal Revenue Service;
- Insufficient offshore surveillance;
- A need for greater cooperation with the Bahamas, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.

While the problems are numerous and serious, we have taken specific initiatives to make improvements in each of those areas.

1. The President intends to nominate Stanley Marcus to be the new U.S. Attorney for Miami. He is a brilliant young prosecutor with a proven record of accomplishment in the area of organized crime.
2. We will work with him in finding the very best assistant U.S. Attorneys from Florida and throughout the rest of the country—prosecutors who have established records of accomplishment in combating crime.
3. We now have an Administrative agreement between the Justice and Treasury Departments in setting up a joint task force consisting of DEA, the FBI and Customs. . . . In order to provide this joint task force with teeth, we will put 130 more Customs investigators into South Florida immediately.
4. As many of you know, the Miami office of the FBI will be strengthened with an increase of 43 new agents. Thirty-three have already arrived.
5. We have approved an increase of 20 agents for the Drug Enforcement Administration to work in Miami.
6. We are establishing a Financial Law Enforcement Center at the Treasury Department which will be extremely helpful in ensuring the full utilization of the information that is now available and of that which will become available under Operation Greenback. The Financial Law Enforcement Center started out with 18 experts. We will add 20 more to work on national problems involved in laundering of money, and an additional 20 experts who will focus on the Miami and South Florida area exclusively.

In this regard, I want to make this point as strongly as I can: Our investigative efforts will be as stringent on bankers and

businessmen who profit from crime as on drug traffickers, the drug pushers, the hired assassins and others. There will be no free lunch for the white-collar criminal.

7. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms will soon be divided with the responsibility for firearms going to the Secret Service. You may be aware of personnel cuts in ATF but I want to assure you that not only will there not be any cuts in the South Florida area; instead we will be beefing up the Secret Service in order to launch an aggressive program to cut back on the illegal use of firearms, including the terrifying use of machine guns now plaguing the City of Miami.

"There will be no free lunch for the white-collar criminal."

8. Along with the Attorney General, I will be working with Chief Justice Warren Burger to see that additional judges are provided to South Florida. Additional courtrooms will be provided to relieve the backlog of cases that are now pending and to expedite those cases that come up in the future.

9. I will appoint an on-scene Task Force Coordinator to be headquartered here in Miami to coordinate local, state, and federal activities. The job will be to make sure that there is complete cooperation among the many diverse departments and agencies involved in solving this problem. The coordinator


The ocean-going vessels shown in silhouette were seized by the Federal Government in the South Florida area within the last year, carrying the amounts of marihuana indicated. Some of them off-loaded their contraband cargo from much larger mother ships.
8,000 lbs.
55,000 lbs.
31,920 lbs.
30,000 lbs.
24,000 lbs.
25,000 lbs.
19,000 lbs.
12,000 lbs.
20,880 lbs.

Vice President George Bush receives a salute from members of the U.S. Coast Guard.

will report directly to the Task Force.

10. The Coast Guard will immediately and significantly increase its forces and manpower in the South Florida area to help in the coming months with the interdiction of illegal drugs and aliens. In addition, there will be no budget cuts for the Coast Guard in South Florida.
11. In order to increase our intelligence and surveillance, we will put back in operation a sophisticated AWAC's type aircraft. This is a highly efficient and effective method of detecting aircraft entering the area illegally. The Customs Department and other law enforcement agencies will be working closely with this intelligence operation.
12. Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan has created a new position in the Internal Revenue Service called Assistant Commissioner for Criminal Investigations. This position will be filled shortly and will allow the IRS to conduct a more aggressive approach to the prosecution of tax-related drug crime.
13. Secretary Haig will work directly with the governments of Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Jamaica to cut the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.
14. The Urban Mass Transit Transportation Administration will provide Metro Dade County with a transit security demonstration grant. This grant will implement a program designed to ensure passengers' security on public transit buses. The program involves the use of plainclothes decoys working in cooperation with uniformed officers.
15. I have established a sub-group of the Task Force headed up by the Department of Justice to look at the problems and find solutions to the overcrowding of federal jails and prisons. This task force wants, and will have, federal facilities to keep criminals off the street.
16. We are working with the Congress and the Departments of Justice and State to expedite the implementation of the President's immigration policy aimed at assisting the South Florida area. In his testimony before the Congress, the Attorney General said, "The Administration is determined not to permit another Mariel."

I am confident that these actions will be of significant assistance, not only in fighting crime but in preventing the influx of illegal immigrants. While it is a lengthy list, there is much, much more to be done. The process of consultation and coordination between the federal establishment and those of you at the local level must and will be improved.

Posse Comitatus

A new law lifts the ban on military participation in anti-drug smuggling operations.

Steven Zimmerman
Office of Chief Counsel

The Latin term *posse comitatus* literally means the "power of the county" and traditionally encompasses the entire population of a county beyond the age of fifteen which a sheriff may summon to his assistance in certain cases. During the Reconstruction Era following the Civil War, U.S. Marshals in occupied southern states often called upon federal troops to form a *posse* for purposes of enforcing local laws. Once southern states regained representation in the Congress, it became a unanimous goal of southern Congressmen to prevent such practices in the future. The result of this sentiment was an 1878 amendment to an Army appropriations bill which is now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1385. The restriction prohibits use of any part of the Army (and now Air Force as well) "as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws." Any willful violation constitutes a

felony punishable by fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.

There is no record of any criminal prosecution under the Posse Comitatus Act in the more than 100 years that it has been in effect. The provision has, however, had a significant influence upon cooperation between military authorities and civilian law enforcement officials. Although there is an agreement that military troops may not be used to supplement civilian law enforcement officials in direct civilian law enforcement activities, there is widespread confusion as to the precise meaning of the ban on use of the Army or Air Force "otherwise to execute the laws." Moreover, case law and legal opinions have not clarified all the ambiguities which exist in this area of the law.

There are some points, however, upon which there is agreement. First, despite claims to the contrary, the Posse Comitatus Act is not a constitutionally mandated statute. Rather, it is subject to revision and exception. In fact, the Act itself permits military assistance in the execution of laws if specifically authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress. Over the years, therefore, the Congress has specifically authorized military assistance to control insurrection, armed rebellion or other unlawful combinations (10 U.S.C. § 331-334), to protect the President from assassination or kidnapping (18 U.S.C. § 1751 (i)), and in such esoteric activities as protecting the rights of the discoverer of a guano island (48 U.S.C. § 1418).

Second, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits "active" or "direct" military assistance in support of civilian law enforcement but permits "passive" or "indirect" aid. It has generally been held therefore that military authorities may lend equipment to civilian law enforcement officials. For example, military authorities loaned armored personnel carriers, helmets, and flak jackets to federal law enforcement authorities during the Wounded Knee incident in 1973. But while military officials may lend a helicopter to civilian officials, they may not provide a military pilot to operate the helicopter in searching for prison escapees. The "active-passive" and "direct-indirect" tests have raised as many questions as they have solved. Of course, military commanders are understandably cautious in assisting where there are doubts about the propriety of a specific request for aid since a mistake could result in a felony conviction.

In an effort to resolve the continuing ambiguities and to clarify the law, the Senate and the House of Representatives independently examined separate proposed bills of legislation regarding Posse Comitatus during 1981. Both bills received affirmative support and were sent to a conference committee for final resolution. Thereafter, on December 1, 1981, President Reagan signed into law the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1982, S. 815. Included as section 905 of the new Public Law 97-86 are the following amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. 1385), codified at Title 10, United States Code, sections 371 to 378.

§ 371. Use of information collected during military operations

The Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other applicable law, provide to Federal, State or local civilian law enforcement officials any information collected during the normal course of military operations that may be relevant to a violation of any Federal or State law within the jurisdiction of such officials.

§ 372. Use of military equipment and facilities

The Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other applicable law, make available any equipment, base facility, or research facility of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps to any Federal, State, or local civilian law enforcement official for law enforcement purposes.

§ 373. Training and advising civilian law enforcement officials

The Secretary of Defense may assign members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to train Federal, State, and local civilian law enforcement officials in the operation and mainte-

nance of equipment made available under section 372 of this title and to provide expert advise relevant to the purposes of this chapter.

The new sections 371-373 of Title 10 incorporate existing interpretations of the Posse Comitatus Act by clearly setting forth statutory authorization for military officials to provide information, equipment and/or facilities and to also provide training and expert advise to civilian law enforcement officials. Provisions are herein incorporated to insure compliance with other applicable laws, such as the Privacy Act and the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act.

§ 374. Assistance by Department of Defense personnel

(a) Subject to subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense, upon request from the head of an agency with jurisdiction to enforce—

(1) the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.) or the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.);

(2) any of sections 274 through 278 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1324-1328); or

(3) a law relating to the arrival or departure of merchandise (as defined in section 401 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1401)) into or out of the customs territory of the United States (as defined in general headnote 2 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (19 U.S.C. 1202)) or any other territory or possession of the United States,

may assign personnel of the Department of Defense to operate and maintain or assist in operating and maintaining equipment made available under section 372 of this title with respect to any criminal violation of any such provision of law.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), equipment made available under section 372 of this title may be operated by or with the assistance of personnel assigned under subsection (a) only to the extent the equipment is used for monitoring and communicating the movement of air and sea traffic.

(c) (1) In an emergency circumstance, equipment operated by or with the assistance of personnel assigned under subsection (a) may be used outside the land area of the United States (or any territory or possession of the United States) as a base of operations by Federal law enforcement officials to facilitate the enforcement of a law listed in subsection (a) and to transport such law enforcement officials in connection with such operations, if—

(A) equipment operated by or with the assistance of personnel assigned under subsection (a) is not used to interdict or to interrupt the passage of vessels or aircraft; and

(B) the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General jointly determine that an emergency circumstance exists.

(2) For purposes of this subsection an emergency circumstance may be determined to exist only when—

(A) the size or scope of the suspected criminal activity in a given situation poses a serious threat to the interests of the United States; and

(B) enforcement of a law listed in subsection (a) would be seriously impaired if the assistance described in this subsection were not provided.

The new section 374 expands military support capabilities in connection with tracking and communicating the movement of air and sea traffic. This section is of particular significance in the area of narcotics enforcement. [See 10 U.S.C. 374(a)(1)]. It is noted that subsection (c) is directed to emergency situations only, as determined jointly by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General. This procedure is intended to focus on the threat of a large-scale criminal activity at a particular point in time or over a definite period and should not be utilized for the declaration of an emergency which would permit use of this subsection's authority on a routine or extended basis.

§ 375. Restriction on direct participation by military personnel

The Secretary of Defense shall issue such regulations as may be necessary to insure that the provision of any assistance (including the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment of any personnel) to any civilian law enforcement official under this chapter does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in an interdiction of a vessel or aircraft, a search and seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.

The new subsection 375 precludes the direct participation of military personnel in any law enforcement action unless that activity is

otherwise authorized by law. The prohibition does not, however, preclude the inherent authority of military personnel to defend themselves or to protect federal property.

§ 376. Assistance not to affect adversely military preparedness

Assistance (including the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment of any personnel) may not be provided to any civilian law enforcement official under this chapter if the provision of such assistance will adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States. The Secretary of Defense shall issue such regulations as may be necessary to insure that the provision of any such assistance does not adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States.

The new subsection 376 provides, generally, that all assistance given by the military be done in such a manner as not to compromise the military preparedness of the United States. To specifically insure this goal, the Secretary of Defense is required to issue all such regulations as may be necessary in this regard.

§ 377. Reimbursement

The Secretary of Defense shall issue regulations providing that reimbursement may be a condition of assistance to a civilian law enforcement official under this chapter.

The new subsection 377 mandates that the Secretary of Defense issue regulations regarding the conditional reimbursement for assistance provided by the military. An analysis of available information reveals the underlying Congressional policy that the Department of Defense exercise discretion and flexibility in the area of cost reimbursement. Many factors should be considered, including the budgetary resources available to the civilian law enforcement agency involved and the situation where information useful to the civilian agency was derived primarily from a military operation. In this regard, it may prove to be fiscally prudent to encourage the military to participate in operational and training activities that would, at the same time, improve support and the informational base necessary to bolster civilian law enforcement objectives.

§ 378. Nonpreemption of other law

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit the authority of the executive branch in the use of military personnel or equipment for civilian law enforcement purposes beyond that provided by law prior to the enactment of this chapter.

(2) The tables of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A of such title and at the beginning of part I of subtitle A of such title are amended by adding after the item relating to chapter 17 the following new item:

18. Military Cooperation With Civil Law Enforcement Officials. .....371.

(b) Not later than 30 days after the end of the 180-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a comprehensive report to Congress on the operation through the end of such period of chapter 18 of title 10, United States Code (as added by subsection (a)). Such report shall include findings of the Secretary concerning the effect of assistance provided under such chapter.

The new subsection 378 insures that the authorization for assistance by the military will not be construed as preempting assistance under any other existing law. [See 21 U.S.C. 873 (b).]

Implementation of the amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act is going to require the issuance of operational regulations from the Department of Defense. A recent press summary indicates that those regulations are currently being drafted and should be published soon. (*Federal Times*, February 1, 1982.)

The effectiveness of Public Law 97-86 may well be determined by logistical considerations. It appears essential that the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) be utilized as the initial repository of all information derived from the military for possible use in the civil law enforcement community. This will maximize the EPIC resource while gaining the most benefit from the experience and expertise of the EPIC personnel. Additional training and manpower may be required to coordinate the further dissemination of information to agencies other than DEA. However, this type of central control will assist in the monitoring of the use of the Posse Comitatus amendments and their effectiveness.

OUTLOOK THROUGH 1984

In March 1982 the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee published its most recent estimate, *The Supply of Drugs to the U.S. Illicit Market From Foreign and Domestic Sources in 1980.* Following are excerpts from a section entitled "Outlook Through 1984."

The NNICC is composed of federal agencies with enforcement, policy, treatment and research, and intelligence responsibilities. The present membership of the Committee is as follows:

- United States Coast Guard
- United States Customs Service
- Department of Defense
- Drug Enforcement Administration
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Immigration and Naturalization Service
- Internal Revenue Service
- National Institute on Drug Abuse
- Department of State
- Department of the Treasury
- The White House

Heroin

Availability of Southwest Asian (SWA) heroin in the United States is likely to increase. Because of greater availability, new (i.e., younger) users will probably be drawn into heroin abuse. SWA heroin, now predominant and readily available in the Northeast corridor, will continue its westward spread. New York will continue to be the major center for the U.S. heroin traffic, but Detroit is likely to increase in importance. Abuse trends in Chicago will worsen if the area's heroin supply is reoriented toward SWA heroin sources in Detroit. A center for SWA heroin distribution on the West Coast may also emerge clearly during the period.

Supplies of opium in Southwest Asia will continue to be abundant. The prospects for effective enforcement action in the region remain bleak. . . . By itself, in an exceptional year, Pakistan can outproduce the Golden Triangle. . . . Afghanistan is likely to be an unknown factor in Southwest Asian opium production so long as the stalemate in Soviet occupation continues. Although new opium laws have been enacted in Iran, it remains to be seen whether the government can regain control of opium production within its territory. . . .

The upheavals in the Middle East indicate further difficulties for U.S. efforts to stop heroin shipments near their source. The Franco-Italian

Cocaine Prices at Successive Stages of Trafficking (1980)



trafficking syndicates will probably maintain their access to supplies of Middle Eastern opiates and are likely to increase their already formidable position in the U.S. market. . . .

Resource problems and the inaccessibility of much poppy cultivation will continue to limit the effectiveness of the Burmese narcotics control programs in the near future. . . . The government has made some progress in checking the insurgencies that rage in the opium producing areas, but, even with this success, they will remain preoccupied with security problems.

The Mexican government continues to move aggressively to locate and destroy poppy fields. Additional sprayer helicopters are being purchased and mobility increased in response to aerial reconnaissance reports of spreading poppy cultivation.

Cocaine

Although an end to the present upsurge in cocaine abuse may not yet be in sight, in the long run, following the pattern of all rapid growth situations, it should taper off. Meanwhile, there are ample illicit stocks of coca leaf in Bolivia and Peru to produce cocaine for the U.S. and European markets for the foreseeable future. Colombia could increase production of cocaine based on local supplies of coca leaf from four tons to over 13 tons as its own new plantings mature.

Growing independence from Peruvian and Bolivian sources of raw material will ensure Colombia's predominance in the world cocaine trade. Colombian traffickers will remain the best organized in terms of cocaine laboratory facilities, smuggling capability, and distribution networks. South Florida and Colombia are likely to remain the financial hubs of the trade.

Coca eradication campaigns were undertaken in Peru in early 1980 with encouraging results, but it remains to be seen whether the government will make timely redistribution of confiscated lands. If the Peruvian government builds credibility for its crop substitution program (an essential ingredient for which will be U.S. assistance), there is an excellent chance for significant impact on, although probably not eradication of, the country's illicit coca problem. Coca eradication in Colombia is still in the pilot stage.

Unabated coca production in Bolivia could nullify the progress being made in Peru. Prospects for improvement in Bolivian coca eradication programs or law enforcement efforts are uncertain. A new government took over in early September 1981 and promised a national crusade against drug trafficking. . . .

Marihuana

It is too soon to say whether the high use rates among U.S. marihuana smokers will level off. A change in the trend may not become clear until the results of the 1981 national household survey are published. The trend toward increased use of higher-potency marihuana seems likely to continue, however.

Domestic production of marihuana will continue to spread throughout the country and will continue to emphasize the high-potency variety known as sinsemilla. Although marihuana cultivation is likely to spread, the typical sinsemilla farm will probably remain in a small-scale operation. . . .

Marihuana policy could become a significant political and economic issue in Colombia's 1982 elections. The prospects for an effective crop control effort in that country are clouded by a controversy over marihuana legalization. If the effectiveness of national police units operating on the north coast of the Guajira Peninsula is maintained, smugglers should experience greater difficulty in exporting marihuana to the United States. . . .

Dangerous Drugs

The United States will continue to provide a profitable market for smuggling and diversion of methaqualone. Colombian traffickers seeking to take advantage of the shortage of Dilaudid on the U.S. illicit market will continue their efforts to divert supplies of hydromorphone.

Drug Enforcement

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Editor, **Drug Enforcement**
Drug Enforcement Administration
1405 Eye Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20537

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☆ USGPO 376-025

3,906 Pounds of Cocaine Confiscated

A New Alliance

Message from William H. Webster, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

On January 21, 1982, Attorney General William French Smith announced his decision to give the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration "concurrent jurisdiction" over violations of the federal drug laws. **Drug Enforcement** *invited FBI Director Webster, who is charged with general supervision of this joint effort, to present his view of what this means to the enforcement community throughout the Nation.*

Francis M. Mullen, Jr.
Acting Administrator
Drug Enforcement Administration

I consider drug trafficking to be the most serious problem facing law enforcement in the United States. No other area of law enforcement calls for a more concerted effort at all levels than our efforts to rid this nation of the scourge of narcotics and drug abuse. Illicit products come into and are manufactured in this country in incredible quantities. They have overwhelmed the resources committed to their interdiction while feeding profits to criminal enterprises and generating corruption, violence and tragedy.

No one knows better than the law enforcement officer the seriousness of the drug problem and just how overwhelmed we are. We have all witnessed or heard about the seizures of enormous quantities of narcotics and the discovery of the wrecks of drug-laden aircraft. These events represent only a fraction of the illegal drugs actually imported and distributed in this country. We know the enormous wealth of the drug merchants which can alter the economy of an entire region, perhaps even the Nation, and be used to corrupt or directly assault the criminal justice process. And we have seen other drug-related crimes, such as murders and burglaries, which are the second, larger wave of the drug problem.

The FBI/DEA alliance is the product of thought, study and debate. Recognizing that we were faced with a growing drug enforcement problem and limited resources, Peter Bensinger and I began to informally explore the options. Last summer, at the direction of the Attorney General, a committee of Department of Justice officials, including Rudy Giuliani, Bud Mullen, and me, began to formally review this matter. The new FBI/DEA relationship that the Attorney General announced in January was our answer to the question, *"What can we collectively do to be more effective and efficient with the resources available to us?"*

In order to provide for greater and more effective coordination, the Attorney General ordered that DEA report to the Director of the FBI and that the FBI be given concurrent jurisdiction with DEA for investigations of violations of the Controlled Substances Act. What does this mean to the American public and to those who have been involved for years in the struggle against illicit drugs?

The FBI *will not* become another DEA. DEA will continue to be the lead organization in the Federal Government's efforts to direct the assault on drug traffickers and to assist state and local law enforcement in their efforts. Nonetheless, there is a need to open new fronts in this war.

The DEA/FBI partnership will insure that the skills and limited resources of both agencies are used in a way which will maximize their effect on the illegal drug trade. It will assist all of us in achieving our goals in the war on drugs.

We are all familiar with the skills of the dedicated men and women who fill the ranks of DEA. They are professionals who have years of experience which cannot be duplicated. Their tools include one of the most advanced systems of drug laboratory analysis in the world, and they have built a close working relationship with local law enforcement agencies.

But the FBI has resources which can and must be made available to address this problem. We have 7,800 Agents who maintain a presence in almost 500 locations throughout the country. Even with our other major investigative responsibilities, this national network of Agents gives us tremendous flexibility and response capabilities to drug-related investigations. It will help us to identify and attack additional problem areas.

We will concentrate our efforts in areas where we have a proven track record and special expertise – against traditional

(Continued on inside back cover)

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Francis M. Mullen, Jr.
Acting Administrator

Horton Heath, Jr.—Editor
Elizabeth D. Nichols—Art Director
Carolyn M. Bronson—Staff Assistant
John J. Boyle—Photographer

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Counterattack on Cocaine

The Strategy of Enforcement

Ronald J. Caffrey
Chief, Cocaine Investigations Section
Drug Enforcement Administration

DEA's enforcement priorities in the future will address a broad spectrum of drug abuse and trafficking. Investigative emphasis and programming will be predicated on national abuse patterns counterbalanced by local geographical trafficking conditions in an attempt to strike at those controlled substances which pose the greater number of hazards to the largest segment of the U.S. population. In establishing enforcement plans and resource allocation for fiscal year 1983, DEA management is currently reviewing cocaine abuse and trafficking worldwide in an attempt to realign priorities with existing drug availability and the attendant hazards to public health, social institutions, and public integrity.

As in years past DEA will continue to focus on heroin—a policy developed as a result of the sudden and dramatic proliferation of Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin trafficking. Heroin and certain dangerous drugs unquestionably pose serious hazards to the public at large. Now, however, the dimensions and impact of the traffic in such substances do not approximate the profound change which cocaine availability and usage have had on the United States. Heroin abuse and trafficking are generally limited to traditional domestic geographic areas. The impact, in terms of drug injury incidents and collateral street crime, while significant, is localized within several large urban areas. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for cocaine, which is being abused throughout the nation on an epidemic scale.

The National Center for Disease Control (CDC) recently issued a statement that ". . . the rate of cocaine-related deaths quadrupled between 1976 and 1981 . . ." while ". . . the rate of cocaine-related hospital treatment showed a sixfold increase from 1975 to 1981." The CDC report continues: "The number of deaths linked to cocaine increased from 4.5 per 10,000 medical examiner reports to 19.1 deaths per 10,000 medical examiner reports between 1976 and 1981." These statistics, while startling to the general public, are no surprise to knowledgeable law enforcement management officials.

Daily newspapers are replete with accounts of notable cocaine abusers and the consequences of cocaine use, but somehow a cynical public, weary of media scare tactics, has grown to accept this drug. In past years cocaine use was restricted to the affluent and the famous, but in 1982 hard medical evidence confirms the health hazards of this substance and its widespread prevalence among all social and economic groups. Cocaine use and availability are proliferating at an alarming rate among the nation's youth. Their role models, professional athletes and entertainment celebrities, openly advertise if not advocate cocaine use. Unfortunately, American youth have been misled by the myth of "harmlessness" and have been corrupted by an advocacy of the "Great American Heroes." "Coke" is no longer a "jet set high." Between 40 and 48 metric tons of cocaine hydrochloride were imported into the United States in 1980, an increase of more than 40 percent over the previous year. These are conservative National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee estimates which are almost two years old. Clearly, cocaine availability and abuse are expanding at a phenomenal rate.

The tragedies suffered by the public because of an annual importation of 48 metric tons of cocaine should be obvious from a medical and sociological viewpoint. The President's Task Force on Crime has established as a national priority a campaign against violent crime. While the connection between heroin trafficking and street violence has been clearly made, statistical evidence shows a higher incidence of violent activity among cocaine traffickers. Intelligence generated through DEA's CENTAC 26—a special probe designed to identify drug-related homicide suspects in Miami, Los Angeles, and New York—clearly establishes the dominance of the "Cocaine Cowboys" in drug-related homicides and assaults throughout the United States. Turf disputes, "ripoffs," business disagreements, internal discipline, and the imposition of silence have all contributed to the escalating violence among cocaine traffickers. DEA intelligence indicates a disproportionate volume of cocaine and an inordinate propensity among organized Colombian cocaine violators to engage in wanton violence against all perceived adversaries, their families, employees, and other "noncombatants." The number of drug-related homicides committed by cocaine traffickers in Miami, Los Angeles, and New York City is a national abbera-



tion. In these cities traffickers have shown an affinity for the use of automatic weapons and have routinely engaged in decapitations, mutilations; and infanticide—symbolic displays of "machismo" often conducted in broad daylight in front of witnesses, in public malls, on highways and in night clubs. This escalated exposure extends unprecedented dangers to the public at large.

Assaults and murders of law officers attempting to cope with this crime wave are also on the rise. Underworld "contracts" against undercover agents and sources are at an all-time high. This predilection towards violence extends to both spontaneous and planned acts against law enforcement officers and signals a total disregard for authority from an underworld element whose presence in America is most often gained through illegal entry at our international borders. DEA investigations indicate that a significant proportion of Colombian cocaine traffickers operating in the United States are illegal aliens. What distinguishes this group from past generations of immigrant violators is that these criminals possess immense cash resources, and hence travel unimpeded throughout the country conducting clandestine activities. By virtue of this infiltration, other forms of criminal and potentially subversive activity are exported to the United States and represent a serious threat to our national security.

Beyond the threat to public health and safety, the cocaine traffic in the United States is siphoning off about 30 billions of dollars annually. Nowhere is this more visible than in South Florida where a dangerous U.S. currency drain has been created by the laundering and transfer of traffickers' assets between U.S., Cayman Islands, and South American banks and currency exchanges. Cocaine trafficking has been established as the most lucrative enterprise of all underworld ventures. At $60,000 per kilo on the wholesale U.S. market (1982 prices) and with an available supply of from 40 to 48 metric tons, the dimensions of this problem are obvious. Because cocaine, marihuana, and clandestinely manufactured quaaludes share common sources of supply in Colombia and elsewhere in Latin America, trafficker assets from all of these illegal enterprises tend to be intertwined at every level of the smuggling and money-laundering chain. As a consequence these funds further the drug traffic in much the same manner as legitimate businesses further their existence and expansion by mergers, partnerships, and the reinvestment of profits. The insidious side effect of these illegal enterprises is that profits from one drug category perpetuate and expand the trafficking in other drugs in a vicious unending cycle.

Another side effect of the "Cocaine Connection" is the endemic corruption created by the almost inexhaustable wealth of the various Colombian trafficking groups. Institutionalized corruption involving banks, businesses, regulatory and law enforcement agencies is escalating both here and abroad. The criminal justice system in the southeastern part of the United States is bursting at the seams. Within current budgets it cannot cope with the resources of Latin American-based traffickers. Corruption is known to exist at the highest levels of some leading coca plant source countries in South America, virtually guaranteeing cocaine lab operators unending supplies of coca paste. In a number of Latin American countries drug-related corruption is undermining the social fabric of society. Greed subsists with national honor and patriotism. Cocaine is establishing a "new politics." Currently, foreign-based cocaine traffickers possess limitless supplies, licenses obtained through corruption, and logistical advantages (aircraft, boats, vehicles, clandestine domestic and foreign properties) which enable them to remain in operation indefinitely. Cocaine trafficking, by virtue of its demonstrably corruptive influence, represents a serious detriment to the morality and leadership of the political, business, and criminal justice communities within the United States.

There is now an enormous resource drain on several elements of local, state and federal government in the southeastern United States—a direct result of Latin American cocaine and other drug trafficking. Millions of dollars are being spent by the U.S. Military, Coast Guard, Customs, DEA and the FBI in the war on drugs in South Florida. These reactionary enforcement efforts are placing a great strain on jailers, judges, and local law enforcement units. The financial and human resource drain is the direct effect of "stop gap" measures for the treatment of a symptom

which has unfortunately become a long-term law enforcement problem. This problem will continue until it is ultimately solved on foreign soil through coca eradication. Clearly, illicit crop eradication is the ultimate prophylaxis—the key to the dissolution of foreign source drug trafficking in the United States.

While the ultimate solution of supply reduction through eradication rests with foreign source nations, the U.S. Government has begun to accelerate this solution and provide more immediate remedies through a variety of interagency initiatives both in the United States and abroad. U.S. State Department eradication initiatives are in various stages of development in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, the principal coca source areas in Latin America. DEA special agents assigned to U.S. Embassy Country Teams in these areas are expanding drug intelligence exchange and with their foreign police counterparts are conducting high-level international cocaine investigations. This liaison program is providing DEA with a growing volume of strategic and operational intelligence necessary for complex drug investigations and programs focused at the highest level of the traffic. Resource assistance to foreign police organizations and governments provided by the U.S. State Department and DEA has produced a necessary linkage in our allied efforts against drug abuse. In the United States, the combined efforts of DEA, FBI, Customs, USCG, the Air Force, Navy, FAA, and INS are providing enhanced interdiction and investigative efforts in the Vice President's South Florida Task Group. This special emphasis program has been established at a point through which from 60 to 75 percent of all cocaine enters the United States.

Cocaine investigations and cocaine suppression programs will be among the most important priorities of the Drug Enforcement Administration throughout 1982 and 1983.

Coca cultivation in the Andean highlands.

In a mounting effort to refine and develop the U.S. drug enforcement program, DEA has recently organized its erstwhile Office of Enforcement into four functional drug desks within the Operations Division (Heroin, Cocaine, Dangerous Drugs, Cannabis). This design is intended to promote an improved management system consistent with the Department of Justice's earlier decision to eliminate regional DEA offices and institute direct field reporting to Headquarters. On May 17, 1982, the functional drug desk concept was implemented. The Cocaine Investigation Section is composed of three managers and ten special agent coordinators, who share foreign and domestic geographic responsibilities for all cocaine investigative activity and programming in DEA. The Cocaine Section's routine duties encompass case monitoring, coordination, and evaluation. Under the direct reporting concept, the Section controls all resources devoted to the cocaine problem in a manner consistent with agency and divisional office enforcement work plans. The Section is also charged with policy formulation and implementation. To promote enhanced cocaine investigative activity the Section is now responsible for the initiation of Special Enforcement Operations (SEOs), formerly known as Mobile Task Forces and CENTACs. The Cocaine Investigation Section's responsibilities extend to the development of special programs aimed at disrupting and reducing clandestine cocaine manufacturing, importation, and domestic trafficking.



Deforestation clears land for more coca.

DEA's El Paso Intelligence Center, a multi-agency intelligence cooperative, continues to provide DEA offices and other federal and local signatories with drug-smuggling intelligence data on a routine basis. DEA's eighteen state and local task forces around the United States address local trafficking problems and provide extended drug investigative programs in areas of minimal DEA presence. This combination of federal and local officers has produced a training mechanism which has resulted in the development of a base-line expertise in drug investigations among local narcotics officers. Further, these units are designed to establish appropriate violator target mechanisms for investigative action.

The implementation of FBI concurrent jurisdiction in federal drug investigations has produced enhanced technical and human investigative resources in the U.S. Government's attack against major trafficking groups. The combined efforts of DEA and the FBI in investigations throughout the country has resulted in more than two hundred joint drug investigations over the past nine months. Approximately 50 percent of these cases involve cocaine traffickers. Further, the FBI's 58 field divisions and sub-offices are providing extended investigative coverage to areas of the country where DEA's presence is minimal or non-existent.

DEA, FBI, and U.S. Treasury Department initiatives focused on the financial assets of cocaine and other drug traffickers have been underway for some time and continue to develop and expand in a host of joint and unilateral operations designed to immobilize drug violators and their resources. Specifically, the objective of these probes is to incarcerate major trafficking targets and to "freeze, seize and forfeit their financial assets," thereby depriving individuals and organizations of essential reinvestment capital. These investigations are being conducted in tandem with drug conspiracy cases and are being vigorously pursued by federal prosecutors who are utilizing and exploiting a variety of federal, criminal and civil statutes. In fiscal year 1981 DEA special agents alone were responsible for the removal of more than $64 million in drug trafficker assets. Current projects predicated an ongoing investigative activity indicate DEA removals of more than $200 million in violator assets by the end of this year.

The Department of Justice has mandated the implementation of Law Enforcement Coordinating Counsels throughout the United States. The Attorney General has tasked U.S. Attorneys to oversee these committees to ensure appropriate utilization of prosecutive resources and, at the same time, coordinate the focus of criminal investigative efforts. The purpose is to ensure appropriate management of law enforcement resources in addressing local as well as national criminal violations. This mechanism provides for ancillary and refined management of prosecutive support and law enforcement emphasis in high drug abuse areas.

The President recently appointed Dr. Carlton Turner as the Director of the Drug Abuse Policy Office and at that time clearly identified public education programs as part of the federal effort to inform the public of the hazards of drug abuse. This is a critical component in a federal strategy to reduce public consumption of controlled substances in the United States.

Coca farm (note leaves drying behind dwelling).

During the past year, a U.S. district judge in a northeastern city, in pronouncing sentence on a prominent motion picture producer convicted for his complicity in a DEA cocaine case, elected to exact a sentence which mandated that the producer exploit his professional position. The judge ordered the defendant to initiate a media event extolling the virtues of a drug-free life style. Consequently, a number of TV and motion picture celebrities participated in a "Get High On Life" campaign which was promoted over national network TV. This unique sentence is an outstanding example of judicial perceptiveness in that it tailors legal sanctions not only to the violation but to the individual and attempts to create more far-reaching impact by affixing remedial societal responsibilities to drug violators.

For many years, law enforcement officials have contended with the frustrations of inadequate bail-setting practices and anomalies in the imposition of equitable sentences in drug cases. Today, however, a more informed, better administered judiciary has begun to undertake a more practical approach to fit sentences to criminal violations and more prudently measure the impact and remedies for these crimes against available prison space and penal resources. Most assuredly, upper-level traffickers can only be immobilized through incarceration and forfeiture of their assets. However, this is only a partial cure for a national disease requiring more innovative holistic approaches.

By now it is evident that the battle against cocaine abuse and trafficking must be fought on several fronts. Foreign supply reduction, increased drug intelligence exchange, enhanced interdiction and investigative effort, measurable reduction in public consumption through education and meaningful sentencing by the judiciary—all represent initiatives which form the basis of the current federal strategies against drug abuse and trafficking in the United States. These remedies must continue to expand and develop in a coordinated fashion if the current availability of cocaine and level of cocaine abuse in the United States are to be significantly curtailed.

History of Coca

The rite of burying coca with the dead dates back more than four thousand years. Traditionally, the deceased were inhumed in a squatting position, wrapped in grave cloths, and surrounded with pottery containing artifacts, maize, and bags of coca, apparently to sustain them on their way to the other world.

International Initiatives to Control Coca Production and Cocaine Trafficking

Dominick L. DiCarlo
Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics Matters

Cocaine, which has been called the drug of the Eighties, is our most rapidly expanding drug problem. The objective of the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) is to reduce cocaine imports through control of coca production at its sources in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. We believe the policies we are applying in negotiations with these governments are necessary to improve prospects for gaining control. But obstacles are abundant in South America. We caution that control—to the point at which cocaine availability in the United States is substantially and permanently reduced—is a long-term effort.

In one or more of the three coca-producing countries, we have had to contend with: frequent changes in governments; local populations heavily dependent upon coca sales and cocaine trafficking for their principal income; populations indifferent to U.S. interests, especially where they have been insulated from drug abuse; traditional chewers of coca leaf whose needs must be met by continuing cultivation; a belief that cocaine abuse is a U.S. problem which creates the trafficking issue; demands that the United States virtually reconstruct the economies of large sections of such countries as an inducement to local cooperation on crop control and interdiction; and sometimes even alleged government involvement in the cocaine trade.

However, there are also incentives for these governments to act, including economic problems, domestic drug abuse problems, international pressure, and insurgencies that may be linked to narcotics trafficking. This interplay of incentives and disincentives defines our opportunities for action.

The three producer countries present different problems. Thus, our strategies vary, but our policy on cocaine control and its premises is uniform. Under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, producer and transit nations like Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia have the primary responsibility for controlling coca and its derivatives within their borders. The international community should assist these nations, and the United States provides bilateral assistance, but we expect these governments to demonstrate their responsibilities through effective programs. Our policy is that the priority should be on coca eradication or other forms of crop control, while narcotics-related development assistance in traditional growing areas should be linked to agreements on crop reduction. We encourage other donor nations and development banks to adopt the same policies.

The problems in common to all three countries are the plant itself and its yields, in cocaine and in profits. Coca is a hardy, deep-rooted plant that is quite difficult to eradicate manually and is usually grown in isolated areas. Coca is an attractive crop for farmers because it has a life span of about 30 years; leaves can be harvested three to six times a year; and it can be grown on poor soils unsuitable for other agriculture. Because most holdings are small, and demand until recently was limited, coca production for the illicit market provided an attractive but not spectacular income. However, in response to increased demand, coca prices accelerated in 1980 to twenty times their previous level, and today illicit coca production is the principal and sometimes only income for thousands of farmers—an income that is many times the daily wages these farmers would earn from other crops.

The financial incentives favor coca cultivation, which is increasing in all three countries. A critical decision in negotiations on crop control, in which the political and economic consequences to the farmer are at issue with the government, is the mix of financial incentives or disincentives (or both) that will be needed to induce desired actions.

Peru

Our problems in Peru, whose coca provides about half of the cocaine consumed in the United States, begin with the fact that large numbers of Peruvians have grown and chewed coca for more than 2,000 years—and agreements must consider that the Government permits and licenses a substantial cultivation for traditional domestic as well as pharmaceutical purposes. The objective then is to curb production in excess of this level and control illegal diversions from the licit cultivation—a task compounded by present conditions: (1) Peru has a weak economy; (2) cocaine trafficking provides several hundred million dollars a year to that economy, making it one of Peru's four

major foreign exchange earners, and (3) coca cultivation has expanded to an estimated 50,000 metric tons, versus an estimated 12,000-14,000 metric tons needed for licit domestic and international use.

The problem of competing interests is evident: Coca cultivation is the major source of income for more than 7,000 farmers in the Upper Huallaga Valley, where most of the production is sold on the illicit market, generating an estimated 60 percent of the region's economy as well as 25 percent of the cocaine consumed in the United States.

The government of President Fernando Belaunde Terry, elected in 1980 after 12 years of military rule, has doubled its resource commitment from $1.5 million to $3 million. The Government is concerned about reports from medical clinics pointing to a serious increase in the dangerous practice of smoking coca paste. In this semi-refined state, coca paste contains such harmful impurities as kerosene and cement. Inhaling into the lungs is especially harmful. Reports indicate widespread smoking of coca paste by high school-age youth. Sensitive to its international image, the Government is also concerned about the potential for official corruption that has occurred in other countries. Peru has increased the number of both people and organizations committed to controlling the coca trade.

Our support has shifted from a focus solely on enforcement to a more balanced program of enforcement, education, and income substitution. This shift reflects a change in strategy toward sustained efforts. For example, Operation Green Sea II in 1980 was a cooperative effort with the Peruvian Government which eradicated nearly 1,500 acres of coca and destroyed 12 million plants and 57 laboratories. While some of the coca fields remain abandoned, the long-term impact of this one-time effort was primarily psychological, putting the cocaine trade on notice to the risks faced, and emboldening the government to take more forceful action.

In contrast, a five-year coca eradication and enforcement project was initiated by INM in 1981, concurrent with the Agency for International Development's (AID) five-year rural development program in the Upper Huallaga Valley. The project is the first in which the long-advocated strategy of coordinating INM's support for enforcement with AID's development assistance is being implemented. This project targets 17,000 hectares (out of 40,000-60,000 under cultivation countrywide). The INM goal is to reduce coca cultivation through eradication and control, while the AID goal is to diversify agricultural production, thereby minimizing the social and economic effects of the control program. In addition to supporting the Guardia Civil's Mobile Rural Patrol Detachment (UMOPAR) in the Upper Huallaga, INM's efforts to enhance the operational and intelligence effectiveness of Peruvian narcotics enforcement agencies include support for other Guardia Civil and Peruvian Investigative Police activities.

While actual eradication has not yet begun in the Upper Huallaga, activities we are supporting were showing these results by mid-1982: About five percent of coca cultivation had been abandoned and other cultivations were not being fully harvested; UMOPAR had increased its arrests and seizures; many large-scale traffickers had departed, leaving small dealers smuggling a few kilograms of cocaine paste; and the profitability of coca cultivation had declined.

INM plans to support coca control programs in other regions by 1984. The Peruvian Government believes there should be an international emphasis on coca control, and the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) is considering a Peruvian request for an Andean office.

Bolivia

In Bolivia, where coca cultivation and consumption have also had historic economic and cultural importance, licit demand requires an estimated 12,000 metric tons out of an estimated production of 50,500 metric tons. Not only has chewing of coca leaf been traditional for centuries, but there are today an estimated 23,000 farm families engaged in growing coca, usually on holdings of one hectare or less, which complicates the eradication problem.

Moreover, the United States is faced with the necessity of starting from ground zero—again—in Bolivia.

Narcotics assistance programs began in Bolivia in 1972; a 1977 agreement provided assistance for narcotics control

and a study of alternate crops. These activities were halted in 1980, after a coup by General Garcia Meza, who allegedly had the support of the "Santa Cruz Mafia," independent organizations in the Santa Cruz area who dominate the cocaine trade.

Narcotics control assistance and other U.S. aid were suspended after the coup to demonstrate our insistence that Bolivia curb coca production and trafficking as well as to satisfy other U.S. concerns.

After a change in government in August 1981 (Bolivia has averaged more than one government per year since the Republic was founded in 1825), discussions on a resumption of coca control assistance were begun with the new Torrelio government. INM is currently discussing an eradication program which, if successfully negotiated and implemented, could reduce Bolivia's enormous coca cultivation to levels needed for legitimate purposes. Under discussion is a program of both voluntary and involuntary crop eradication and controls, focusing first on illicit production in non-licensed areas, and then on controlling excess production in licensed areas (the key Chapare and Yungas regions).

In addition to factors of international image and responsibility, the incentives for action are Bolivia's need for resumption of U.S. economic assistance, and its need to control negative effects of drug trafficking on the Bolivian economy (for example, the disruption of the agricultural labor force, and the flow of inflationary, untaxed dollars into the legitimate economy), while, at the same time, overcoming the competing restraints of self-interest by offsetting the political and financial impacts control programs could have on the economies of the growing and trafficking areas.

Colombia

Colombia, the major exporter of marihuana to the United States and the major refining and transshipment center for Bolivian and Peruvian coca, now processes and distributes up to 70 percent of the cocaine entering the United States. Moreover, Colombian farmers are now cultivating about 7,200 acres of coca (4 tons of cocaine) and this cultivation could yield up to 13 tons of cocaine by 1985.

The value to the Colombian economy of cocaine and marihuana trafficking is estimated at $1 billion to $1.5 billion. Perhaps $500 million remains in country and there are indications that, as in other countries, this inflationary, untaxed drug money is undermining the legitimate economy. Traffickers launder narco-dollars through the over-invoicing of exports, through front companies, farm and cattle purchases and the conversion of dollars on the black market. Not only does this dollar flow frustrate fiscal and monetary planning, but it has become increasingly difficult to find farm labor for other crops, thus disrupting agricultural production.

Recently, there has been evidence that Colombian guerrilla groups are utilizing drug trafficking as a source of income to pay for arms shipments.

While the government of President Turbay, who has been sensitive to these negative effects on his government and country, has cooperated through narcotics control agreements with the United States, there is not a country consensus on drug control. Many Colombians consider drug trafficking a problem created by and pertaining solely to the United States. The National Association of Financial Institutions has even campaigned for legalizing the cultivation and export of marihuana to increase government tax revenues and to assist the growers.

However, both the government and private sectors have begun to realize the magnitude of the negative effects of the drug problem on Colombia. Corruption among government officials, the growth of an illegal economy the government does not regulate or tax, the influx of uncontrolled sums into the legitimate economy, and threats to political stability have increased Colombian awareness of drug traffic-related problems.

Building on U.S. support, which began in 1973, INM has since 1978 provided technical assistance and training, and financial resources to upgrade Colombian

History of Coca

Coca leaves are believed to have been used for ritual purposes since prehistoric times. Priests of the Andean highlands chewed coca to go into trances. It was later relied on to prophesy and to interpret sacred myths as they were handed down from one generation to the next. At the height of Incan power coca was a prerogative of the royal court. It was regarded as sacrilege to chew it except on ceremonial occasions.

capabilities in drug interdiction and manual eradication, in judicial processing and intelligence collection, as well as in drug abuse prevention to help the Colombians cope with their own drug abuse problems. A manual coca eradication program was begun in 1981. In 1981, Colombian authorities seized 349 kilograms of cocaine and destroyed 237,401 coca plants and 58 cocaine laboratories. With the exception of cocaine seizures, these figures compare favorably with 1980, when the totals were: 1,545 kilograms of cocaine seized, 106,665 coca plants destroyed, and 54 cocaine laboratories destroyed.

INM plans to discuss an intensified coca control program with the new Colombian government which took office in August 1981.

Conclusion

The world market for cocaine is presently estimated at less than 60 tons, with 40-48 tons imported into the United States. Current estimated production of coca is sufficient to produce as much as 156 tons of cocaine. This output and stockpiles in Peru and Bolivia are enough to supply the U.S. and world markets for years to come. To reduce cocaine availability substantially and permanently in the United States, we must achieve simultaneous control in Peru and Bolivia, while ensuring that Colombian production is contained and that new cultivation is prevented elsewhere.

While the reports on plant destruction, seizures and arrests show some progress, we have not yet achieved the levels of coca control desired in any of these countries.

The farmers' economic and political interests are issues of concern to these governments. But, there are also pressures on these governments to bring the coca problem under control: These governments are aware that the continued supply of cocaine to the United States, Canada, and Western Europe affects their international standing; the willingness of the United States to link development assistance to government actions to control coca production and trafficking has demonstrated to Peru and Bolivia the intensity of the U.S. concern; there are perceptions among government leaders of actual or potential links between narcotics trafficking and insurgent groups; the undermining of local economies and the impacts of their own emerging drug abuse problems add to these pressures. Buttressing these incentives to act is the U.S. policy that we will help provide the means not only to gain control of coca production and cocaine trafficking but—with other sources of economic assistance—will also consider financial alternatives to the farmers, conditioned upon commitments to crop control and reductions in production.

We are undertaking other initiatives in addition to direct U.S. efforts in the producing countries. We are encouraging European governments impacted by cocaine abuse to participate in coca control programs, and to apply their own international influence on the producer nations. We are cooperating with governments and private institutions to inform the peoples of Peru, Bolivia, and especially Colombia about the major efforts underway to reduce U.S. domestic drug abuse problems. We are supporting interdiction efforts in neighboring countries, like Ecuador and Brazil, as well as in the Caribbean, to interrupt trafficking and to deny processors access to precursor chemicals.

Throughout South America, we work in close cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Administration on these projects to halt the flow of cocaine to the United States. Our agencies have confidence in these policies and programs. But, as stated at the outset, cocaine control is a long-term effort in which we are dependent upon the actions of other governments to meet their agreed responsibilities.

History of Coca

After the Spanish Conquest, a new priestly class determined to eliminate coca chewing because of its connection with native religious practices. Though they failed to carry out this task, the conquistadores soon discovered that coca helped field hands, tin and silver mine workers, and messengers on foot to offset the effects of malnutrition and exhaustion in the mountain air. They began to raise coca on plantations, to pay workers in leaves as part of their wages, and to levy taxes on the fruits of their labors. Green coca leaves for the first time became recognized as money.

Health Hazards of Cocaine

Sidney Cohen, M.D.
Department of Psychiatry
U.C.L.A. School of Medicine

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As with all major mood-changing drugs, the cocaine state is not easily reduced to words. But an attempt will be made to describe the changes that take place, recognizing that the actual effects vary with the dose, the manner of usage, the mood, the expectations and personality of the user, and the conditions under which it is employed. Not only the belief system of the individual, but also the social and cultural beliefs will modify the experience.

1. Acute Positive Effects

The first perceptible alteration is a loosening of restraints over emotions and a feeling of pleasure. Shortly thereafter, the positive mood intensifies into euphoria, elation, and perhaps feelings of ecstasy. Attentional changes occur, including hyperarousal, hypervigilance and hyperexcitability. Feelings of competence and power are noted. Thinking seems accelerated and remains appropriate at low dosage levels. A fine tremor of the outstretched hands might occur. The physical stimulation can give rise to restlessness. Pre-existing shyness, tension, and feelings of inferiority tend to disappear.

2. Acute Negative Effects

At times the dominant feeling tone is one of anxiety and agitation. Some nausea might be felt and rarely vomiting. The pupils are dilated producing mild degrees of light sensitivity. Sweating and palpitations may be noticed. Inability to sleep is a normal component of the state.

The blood pressure is increased by about 15 percent. The heart rate can be accelerated 50 percent above the resting state. Body temperature may be elevated. The respiratory rate may increase slightly at average dosages.

Paranoid thinking mechanisms may emerge. In bygone days these were called the "bull horrors," a fear of the police. Suspiciousness rather than grandiosity is the usual characteristic of the paranoid process. Apathy and confusion can develop in contrast to the more common clearheadedness and the impression that one is thinking better than ever. "Snowlights" are flashes seen usually at the periphery of the visual field. They are probably the effect of cocaine on the retina and optic nerves.

3. The Cocaine Psychosis

At high dosages and with frequent consumption a mild or serious break with reality can develop. Tactile hallucinations, the perception of something crawling under the skin, have been called "coke bugs." The belief may be so real that ulcerations of the skin from trying to dig out the parasites are sometimes produced. Other hallucinatory events also occur. These are visual, auditory or gustatory. The visual misperceptions are sometimes of miniaturized objects. The paranoid ideas become very real and urgent. Guns may be carried, and violence has occurred in an effort to deal with imagined persecutors. Violence is less frequent with cocaine than with the amphetamines because of the brevity of the cocaine state. Stereotyped behavior is only infrequently witnessed, that is, repetitious motor behavior such as continuously polishing some object or pacing back and forth as long as the drug is active. Sometimes the psychotic experience has a predominant depressive component accompanied by a melancholy mood or the inability to feel any emotion whatsoever.

The psychotic state may remit after a few days or continue for weeks or months. The prolonged reactions seem to trigger a dormant schizophrenic process, but they also occur in people without a family history or apparent predisposition to schizophrenia.

4. The Post-Cocaine State

Headache is a not uncommon hangover effect. At the end of a cocaine run unhappiness or an inability to feel anything often emerges. Weight loss to the point of emaciation might be obvious, and it is due to lack of food intake along with increased amounts of physical activity. A sense of lethargy may remain for a few days.

Treatment of Toxicity

1. Acute Toxicity

The goal of the emergency management of overdose is to keep the patient alive for a short period of time while permitting the liver and blood enzymes to

"The question becomes: Is the 'high' worth the 'low' and the possible painful break with reality?"

metabolize the cocaine. It is estimated that one lethal dose an hour can be broken down by enzymatic action in the body. An airway should be maintained, and assisted breathing with oxygen initiated. An electrocardiogram should be taken to determine if a heart rhythm disturbance is present. The foot of the bed can be elevated. Cocaine convulsions are refractory to many anticonvulsant drugs. Intravenous diazepam (Valium) is ordinarily used. The respiratory depression that accompanies cocaine poisoning will be made worse with barbiturates. The phenothiazines (like Thorazine) antagonize most symptoms of cocaine toxicity, but they should be used with care in instances of respiratory depression. Inderal (propanolol), a beta adrenergic blocking agent, has not proven to be helpful.

On rare occasions a person may have swallowed a series of finger cots or condoms containing cocaine in order to smuggle the material across a national boundary. Once in a while these burst, releasing large quantities of cocaine into the gastrointestinal tract. Deaths have occurred, but some people have been rescued with immediate cardiorespiratory support.

2. Chronic Use

The major problems of chronic use are drug-induced paranoid thinking resulting in inappropriate aggressive behavior behavior, a prolonged psychotic or depressive reaction, or an inability to function due to increased cocaine use.

The guidelines for management might include:

1. Immediate stoppage of the drug. An abstinence period in a hospital is worthwhile. Significant withdrawal symptoms can be treated with sedatives. Long-term removal from the cocaine environment and cocaine-using friends is necessary. Relapse is a possibility after months, perhaps years, of abstinence.

2. Usually, individuals come to treatment after a catastrophe: a psychotic break, serious impairment of health, loss of job or family, or a serious suicide attempt. They may be highly motivated to stop initially, but over time their motivation tends to wane. An important aspect of therapy is to maintain the strong desire to remain abstinent.

3. Sometimes, family or concerned friends see the destructive nature of the cocaine usage before the user acknowledges it. In such instances group confrontation may be persuasive. This is not an accusatory encounter, rather it is a friendly, loving meeting that takes the place of the impending catastrophe. It should be led and monitored by the therapist. The goal is to change the drug-using behavior and to instill a positive attitude toward treatment.

4. Life-style changes have to be made. The person must switch from cocaine to gratifying nondrug activities. These will not match cocaine in providing peaks of pleasure, but they will be more sustaining. A series of alternative involvements should be planned with the active help and consent of the client, and an effort made to see that they are accomplished. Jogging has been claimed to be beneficial as an activity that sometimes provides a "high" for the person who jogs long enough. The counselor-therapist has two tasks, one of which is educational. The client should become aware of the nature of cocaine and the pitfalls associated with its use. This may help bolster the desire to abstain. The second task is to support, explain and encourage until the client appears to have stabilized.

5. The client's physical condition may have deteriorated as a result of extended cocaine use. Any nutritional deficiency ought to be corrected and an optimal physical state achieved.

6. Pharmacotherapy. Treatment of moderate to severe depressions may be required. Tricyclic antidepressants are the drugs of choice. Lithium has been found to block the cocaine reaction, but so far no studies have been reported in which lithium is used to prevent cocaine use. Most cocaine users are also polydrug consumers. Sedatives and other stimulants should be avoided, else they will be overused.

7. Group therapy with other cocaine or polydrug abusers has been helpful, and where such groups of recovered and recovering people are available, they can be a helpful therapeutic device.

Discussion

Cocaine fits well into the spirit of our times. Pleasure now, hedonism and a narcissistic self-indulgence are a way of

life for growing numbers of people. Cocaine is the ideal chemical for the hedonist or anyone without particular concern about the future.

Many people use cocaine to improve their ability to work, not only to keep going when exhausted, but also to excel in activities in which they are not confident of their ability. Cocaine generates confidence and alerts the mind, producing a better performance, or the illusion of it. Over time cocaine use becomes a necessary prelude to work because confidence is lost in one's intrinsic ability to accomplish without it.

Another reason for the popularity of cocaine is its unjustified reputation for being harmless. The clinical and forensic data on this point indisputably show that acute and chronic complications are by no means infrequent. Just how its undeserved reputation for being safe arose is obscure. Perhaps it derives from the coca leaf chewing experience, and this was thoughtlessly carried over to cocaine.

For any drug to be attractive as an item of abuse, it must alter mood and consciousness. It need not elevate mood or enhance consciousness. "Downers" or hypnosedatives, for example, depress the brain and its ability to be aware, yet this benumbed state is well thought of by manipulators of their minds. But cocaine is a mood elevator and awareness enhancer—the most effective we have. It does not rival the electrical stimulation of the pleasure centers but while some people are willing to tickle their reward centers with a chemical, to date hardly anyone seems desirous of having electrodes implanted into their pleasure centers. So with fair numbers who incorporate a drug like cocaine into their body in one way or other, what can be said of the consequences and the ethical issues involved? The consequences have already been discussed. The ethical questions are not clearly drawn except for the traditional proscriptions against unearned pleasure and the value of delayed gratification. Such interdictions may not hold much weight with present-day liberated Western men and women who live without particular allegiances to traditions or concerns for others.

Even to the most self-centered among us something about the consequential use of cocaine can be said. The neurophysiology of the brain dictates that when a marked deviation of its chemistry occurs, the inevitable effort to reachieve homeostasis results in an overshoot. If the shift was produced by cocaine, the swing back from the "high" goes below the baseline to a variable depth. This is no sermon about the Judeo-Christian ethic, rather it represents a known oscillation in neuronal metabolism in its effort to reachieve a steady state. The price to be paid for the extreme high is simply the down swing of the built-in homeostatic pendulum.

The question becomes: Is the "high" worth the "low" and the possible painful break with reality? Even the most hedonistic must take note of and wonder about such eventualities because of the unpleasure that accompanies these aspects of cocaine use.

There is a phrase used among cocaine users—"a coke whore." This is a person, male or female, who hangs around the coke scene and will do anything, sexual or otherwise, for a snort, shot or drag of cocaine. When this level of human bondage is thoroughly understood, cocaine is understood.

Fake Coke

Toot, Florida Snow, Supercaine, Ultracaine **– these are a few of the trade names of cocaine substitutes sold openly in 'head shops' that cater to the drug culture and through the U.S. mail.**

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has recently warned that these white powders, which look like cocaine, can be as hazardous as the high-priced original.

FDA has already received reports of three deaths associated with sniffing or injecting these look-alike products, many of which contain local anesthetics such as lidocaine, procaine and tetracaine.

Although they are not controlled substances, the cocaine substitutes are subject to FDA regulation under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.

The main dangers of these substances is that they can collapse blood vessels, depress heart muscle strength, and lower blood pressure.

In issuing the warning, FDA Commissioner Arthur Hull Hayes Jr. stated: "The diversion and misuse of these cocaine substitutes is a newly emerging public health problem with deadly consequences. We are asking all manufacturers and distributors to help stop this diversion of these relatives of cocaine."

Pre-Columbian artifacts, some dating as far back as three thousand years, depict men with a distinctive bulge in their cheeks. This bulge is, without doubt, a cud of coca leaves that had been thoroughly chewed and then placed between the cheek and teeth to be sucked and eventually swallowed.

Chewing coca, as contrasted to inhaling, smoking or shooting up cocaine, produces such different effects upon the individual that they almost, but not quite, can be considered different drugs. Certainly, the Altiplano Indian chewing coca for his needs is obtaining an entirely different effect than the suburbanite snorting a line of cocaine through a gold tube.





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COCA CULTIVATION

The coca plant, *Erythroxylum coca*, or Bolivian coca, grows well on the eastern foothills of the Andes, in the upper Amazon basin, and can be cultivated in many tropical climates. It grows as a shrub or tree at altitudes between 1,500 and 6,000 feet above sea level. *E. coca* is widely used for leaf chewing and cocaine production. Another species, *Erythroxylum novgranatense* (Trujillo variety), is also called Peruvian coca. It is now grown in Colombia for its cocaine content.

The elliptical leaves can be harvested by the third or fourth year after planting, and they continue to produce for about 20 years. About three or four crops a year are picked. The leaves contain some 18 alkaloids of which cocaine is the principal component. It makes up about 0.5 to 1.0 percent of the leaf by weight, and is presumably present to provide a bitter taste that would make it aversive to foraging animals.

Experimental coca cultivation by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.



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

Colombian Coca

In the remote *Llanos* (plains) of eastern Colombia, it is possible to buy a hectare of land for six U.S. dollars, clear it, and cultivate coca with little fear of intrusion, except from the air. A typical plot may be seen below with a shed that serves as an on-site coca base laboratory.



Since large quantities of gasoline are used in the initial stages of the conversion process, laboratory destruction is easy but can also be dangerous.

A Colombian soldier shows how easy it is to uproot from loose soil a coca bush about three or four years old.

The Conversion Process

When coca leaves are steeped with kerosene, sulfuric acid and an alkali, coca base is formed. This is a rather crude conglomerate of coca alkaloids and oils and has a cocaine content of 70 to 85 percent. Addition of hydrochloric acid will provide the salt, cocaine hydrochloride, with a purity of 90 to 100 percent depending on the sophistication of the extraction process. It looks like fine white flakes or rocks and feels powdery when crushed.

It is either crude paste or cocaine hydrochloride that is brought from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia for transshipment to Miami and other large American cities by air and sea. From the point of entry it is redistributed through a dealer network that is generally separate from the heroin distribution system. Before arriving at the ultimate consumer it is ordinarily cut four to eight times so that pure cocaine is essentially unknown at present and is no longer available except to the major distributors who have access to it. In fact, some cocaine sold on the street turns out to contain no cocaine at all.





Magnified 3X

Notable Cases

The following accounts record the interception of four tons of cocaine in a recent six-month period.

Miami International Airport, March 9 – On the lookout for an air cargo shipment of "bluejeans" consigned to a Miami shipping firm, U.S. Customs intercepted 3,906 pounds of cocaine – the largest domestic seizure on record. The intelligence, provided by DEA, originated in the circumstances of another joint federal agency seizure of 70 pounds of cocaine only 18 days earlier at the same site.

New Iberia, La., May 18 – The pilot of a Convair 880 cargo jet, a Cuban, and his American co-pilot, both residents of Miami, had been transporting cattle from Louisiana to Panama. On a return trip they failed to acknowledge a request to make radio contact with FAA Houston as they approached the Louisiana coast. Acting on an alert by DEA's El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), U.S. Customs Patrol Officers at Acadian Regional Airport searched the aircraft and seized 1,197 pounds of cocaine sewn into 25 cloth cattle feed bags.

Kennedy International Airport, N.Y., May 29 – A Bolivian diplomat on an Aerolineas Argentinas flight from Buenos Aires, holding a ticket to Los Angeles, presented a diplomatic passport to U.S. Customs officials as they were looking over his luggage. He explained that he was on his way to Mexico City, where he was stationed as cultural attache, after attending a meeting of the Organization of American States. Since he was without diplomatic status in this country, the officials opened his luggage and found 11 pounds of high-purity cocaine in two gift-wrapped packages. He was the fifth foreign envoy in two months to be charged with smuggling drugs into the United States.

Bogota, Colombia, June 11 – The Colombian National Police seized 65 kilograms (143 pounds) of cocaine hydrochloride, with a cache of methaqualone tablets, acting on information furnished by a DEA investigation of precursor chemical supplies.

Brazilia, June 11 – At a jungle outpost in the state of Amazonas, the Brazilian military intercepted an aircraft in transit between Bolivia and Colombia with 123 kilograms (270 pounds) of cocaine. The seizure is the largest to date in which DEA investigations have played a direct role in cooperation with the National Police. The pilot, a Brazilian, and a Colombian national were arrested. Two others on board escaped from the scene.

Brookhaven, N.Y., June 24 – On a flight from Colombia, after refueling at an undisclosed location, a twin-engine Cessna Titan 404 equipped with extra, illegal fuel tanks touched down before dawn with its landing lights off and taxied to one end of the Brookhaven Airport. Three men got out and offloaded eight brown duffle bags onto a Dodge stationwagon. Waiting behind trees to arrest them was a large contingent of DEA and U.S. Customs agents with police officers of Suffolk and Nassau counties as well as from New York State. The duffle bags were found to contain a total of 610 pounds of cocaine in plastic bags and gift wrappings – the largest seizure of its kind to date in the northeastern United States. Although armed with revolvers, handgrenades, and a loaded submachine gun with a silencer, the three were taken into custody without incident. The plane took off and landed again at a neighboring airport where a fourth suspect got off and took a taxi to his home in Sayville. He, too, was arrested. But the pilot was not arrested. Recruited with the assistance of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, he served as the key informant in an extended, ten-month investigation.

Los Angeles, June 24 – After a 10-month Title III (wiretap) investigation, an indictment was returned in the Central District of California charging a corporation and 20 defendants with conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise, as well as currency and drug violations, for allegedly laundering $29 million in drug money through banks in Florida and California. In Miami, seven search warrants were served, three persons were arrested, and three kilograms of cocaine were seized together with $185,000 in cash; an additional $400,000 in a bank account was seized by IRS under a jeopardy tax assessment. In Los Angeles, eight search warrants were served, three persons were arrested, and two kilograms of cocaine were seized along with $160,000 and an Apple Computer. In San Francisco, three search warrants were served, three persons arrested, and $127,000 were seized along with another Apple Computer. Across the country federal and state authorities have so far seized a total of 60 kilograms of cocaine and more than a million dollars in cash in this ongoing investigation. Meanwhile, special investigators of the IRS and the FBI are searching the memories of the seized computers for further records of covert drug and financial transactions.

Cleveland, Tenn., July 11 – DEA agents with members of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and the Highway Patrol arrested four men in three cars and a van after they turned off Interstate 75 and stopped at a local convenience store. Aboard the train of vehicles were found 26 duffle bags containing 1,254 pounds of "nearly pure" cocaine. It was the biggest such seizure in the state's history, nearly double the amount taken at a Sevier County airport in March 1981, which had been packaged in much the same way. Altogether nine defendants were arrested, five of them at a motel in nearby Loudon. The enforcement team seized also two handguns, one machine gun, and more than $400,000 in cash, mostly in $100 bills.

San Diego, July 23 – Two days after an unidentified yacht from Mexican waters arrived with 50 pounds of cocaine, two pounds of it were recovered in an undercover purchase by the San Diego Narcotic Task Force, using a $40,000 flashroll. Two defendants were arrested and the funds secured without incident, although one of them was armed with a .25 caliber pistol. At the home of the other defendant, after obtaining the consent of his parents to conduct a search of the premises, the Task Force recovered the remaining 48 pounds from a suitcase in his bedroom.

Quitos, Peru, July 26 – The Peruvian Investigative Police, in coordination with DEA, seized 209 kilograms (460 pounds) of cocaine base sealed in the false bottoms of 55-gallon drums. One defendant was arrested after loading the drums on a barge, which he had leased from the Peruvian Army, for shipment to a construction site near the Colombian border.

The Growth of Cocaine Abuse

A Report by the
Strategic Cocaine Unit of
the DEA Office of Intelligence



Major indicators have reflected a persistent, and at times marked, growth in abuse and availability of cocaine in the United States since 1976. Likewise, cocaine availability is increasing in all source countries in South America, which will ensure a steady supply to the United States and other consumer countries in the near future.

In recent years a considerable number of additional coca bushes have been planted in response to the expanding international cocaine market. These plantings will reach maturity in the next year or two and, if unchecked, will greatly increase the supply of coca leaf available to illicit markets. Local and U.S.-assisted programs to identify and map coca cultivation have confirmed higher estimates of cultivation and yields in Bolivia and Peru. Cultivation of coca for non-traditional uses is expanding in south and southeast Colombia and has also been reported in northwestern Brazil close to the Colombian border.

Estimated Coca Production in Metric Tons

	1980	*1981*
Peru	**50,000**	**50,000**
Bolivia	**52,500**	**55,000**
Colombia	**2,000**	**3,000**

Bolivia has increased in importance as a source country for cocaine hydrochloride, accounting for 25 percent of the cocaine seized in the international traffic during 1980. Although the greatest number of seizure incidents are related to Peru, that country accounts for the smallest amount of cocaine among the three primary source countries. Peru has become the most popular source country for Americans, Canadians, and Europeans trafficking in kilogram quantities of cocaine.

Colombia is and will remain in the foreseeable future the principal processor of cocaine hydrochloride in South America. Although Colombia has been a minor source for coca leaf, cultivation has now reached a commercial scale for cocaine trafficking purposes. The increased evidence of coca paste laboratory activity indicates that many plantings are for non-traditional uses. While coca leaf production is increasing in Colombia, the country's principal role will remain as a processing center and staging area. In 1980, Colombia was the source of 70 percent of the cocaine seized in the United States for which the origin could be identified. Colombia processes approximately one half of the world's cocaine hydrochloride, but the country's share of the cocaine market may decrease as production increases elsewhere.

Florida remains the primary transshipment point within the United States for cocaine en route from South America. Moreover, the majority of the cocaine seized in the United States during 1981 entered at some point in Florida. Intermediate distribution points were Chicago, Kansas City, Detroit, Atlanta, Denver, Houston, Dallas, Phoenix, New York City, and Baltimore. Intermediate cocaine distribution networks often overlap and supply the same cities being supplied by other intermediate points or directly by Florida.

Historically, the first use of cocaine was coca leaf chewing among the Indians of the Andes. It was initially used in tribal ceremonies. Later the Spanish conquerors encouraged wider use among the Indians because of its hunger-deadening effect. The alkaloid of the coca leaf, cocaine, was first isolated in the 1850's. During the next 50 to 60 years, the drug was widely utilized as a local anesthetic and in patent medicines and tonics. Currently, the medical use of cocaine is limited to eye disorders and in certain types of surgery.

Cocaine abuse became widespread in the 1890's. At that time the drug was considered "safe" in that it did not present the physical addiction potential of morphine. However, psychological dependence was then poorly understood. Except for a brief resurgent period in the 1920's, epidemic cocaine abuse waned and virtually disappeared until the mid-1960s. Today, growing popularity of the drug is evidenced by recent large seizures that reflect the all-out efforts of smugglers trying to keep pace with the current demand.

Cocaine abusers have in the past ingested cocaine for the most part by inhalation, a process known as "snorting." To experience a more rapid effect, users have recently become more experimental and frequently inject or smoke cocaine, the latter process known as "freebasing." Another ingestion method, which in the past was almost exclusively used by heroin addicts, is the mixing of cocaine with heroin to enhance the effects. This preparation is commonly known as a

"speedball" or "hardball" and is administered by injection.

In the last three years there have been an increasing number of heroin treatment admissions in which cocaine has been listed as a secondary drug: 17.3 percent in 1979; 19.6 percent in 1980; 22.6 percent in 1981.

Estimate of Illicit Cocaine Entering the United States in 1981 (in Tons)

Estimated maximum illicit cocaine hydrochloride theoretically available for world use.	140-172
Less cocaine hydrochloride not converted because of inefficient production methods, crop loss, excessive cultivation, spoilage, loss in transit, pilferage, eradication, and seizure of prime materials.	90
Subtotal:	50-82
Less amount seized worldwide.	8
Subtotal:	42-74
Less cocaine hydrochloride exported to third countries (Europe, Canada, and Latin America).	12
Range of cocaine hydrochloride estimated to enter the U.S. market.	30-62

Major indicators reflect continued widespread availability and abuse of cocaine in the United States. During the first half of 1981, national cocaine injuries averaged 837 per quarter. This represents a 50 percent increase over the 1979 quarterly average and an increase of more than 110 percent over 1977 figures.

National Cocaine Injuries (Quarterly Average)

Year	*Number of Injuries*
1977	397
1978	479
1979	557
1980	808
1981	866

Comparative data on cocaine deaths are as follows:

National Cocaine Deaths

Year	*Number of Deaths*
1979	88
1980	96
1981	96 (estimated 1981)

Treatment admissions during the same period also show an increase for cocaine admissions as a primary drug of abuse. This figure rose in 1981 to 3,393 per quarter, from 946 per quarter in 1977, an increase of more than 350 percent.

Cocaine Federally Funded Drug Treatment Admissions (Quarterly Average)

Year	*Number of Admissions*
1977	946
1978	1,361
1979	1,961
1980	2,620
1981	3,393 (Based on first half of CY 1981)

Despite the virulence of cocaine abuse shown by these indicators, they probably understate the problem because cocaine, unlike other abuse substances, such as heroin and methaqualone, has been demonstrated to be less toxic and therefore generally less debilitating than those drugs. This, in turn, would cause cocaine, more than likely, to have a higher percentage of non-reported abuse cases.

Cocaine has manifested significant long-range increases in abuse and availability in all geographic areas of the country. This phenomenon suggests an appeal to a broader sociological segment of the U.S. population than is the case for most abused substances. The following table indicates how these increases have been consistent throughout most of the nation during the past five years.

Regional Cocaine Injuries (Quarterly Average)

	1977	*1978*	*1979*	*1980*	*1981*
Northeast	234	286	277	468	479
Southeast	58	78	108	118	90
North Central	56	60	85	95	103
South Central	8	13	24	24	39
West	41	44	63	105	155

Retail prices and purities showed little long-range change during the last five years. This becomes more apparent when taking into consideration inflation and the rise in the consumer price index during this period.

(Continued on page 20)

Theoretical Maximum Cocaine Available from Coca Leaf Produced in Peru and Bolivia

PERU

1.

Annual Production

50,000 hectares under cultivation
x 1,000 kilos per hectare

50,000,000 kilos of leaf

2.

Accountable Stocks:

12,000,000 kilos for chewing
kilos exported worldwide
+2,000,000 domestic use accountable

14,000,000 kilos accountable

3.

Potential Unaccountable Stocks:

50,000,000 kilos of leaf
- 14,000,000 kilos accountable

36,000,000 kilos potentially unaccountable

BOLIVIA

1.

Annual Production:

35,000 hectares under cultivation
x 1,500 kilos per hectare

55,000,000 kilos of leaf (rounded)

2.

Accountable Stocks:

15,530,000 kilos for chewing
2,000,000 kilos exported worldwide
+ UNKNOWN

17,530,000 kilos annually accountable

3.

Potential Unaccountable Stocks:

55,000,000 kilos of leaf
- 16,000,000 kilos accountable

39,000,000 kilos potentially unaccountable

4.

Reduction to Cocaine Hydrochloride:

A. Coca leaf to Coca Paste (Reduction Factor = 200:1)

36,000,000 kilos of leaf = 180,000 kilos paste
39,000,000 kilos of leaf = 195,000 kilos paste

B. Paste to Cocaine Hydrochloride (Reduction Factor = 2.5:1)

180,000 kilos paste = 72,000 kilos of cocaine
195,000 kilos paste = 78,000 kilos of cocaine
72 metric tons + 78 metric tons = 150 metric tons of cocaine hydrochloride
150 metric tons + 6 metric tons from Colombia leaf = 156 metric tons of cocaine hydrochloride

5.

Allowing 10 percent margin of error each way, the 156 metric tons theoretical maximum of cocaine hydrochloride available from coca leaf produced in Peru and Bolivia produces a range of 140 to 170 metric tons.

(Continued from page 19)

Cocaine Retail Price and Purity Index (Per Gram)

Year	*Price*	*Purity Percentage*
1977	$570-720	12.2
1978	$590-650	12.5
1979	$570-780	11.1
1980	$630-710	12.5
1981	$630-700	11.8

This price stability demonstrated that traffickers, while making considerable profits, were also able to meet growing demand despite losses resulting from interdiction at the ports and borders.

The ability of traffickers to meet the growing demand may be attributed to a number of strategic factors that, when taken in combination, are characteristic of cocaine:

- High profit margin per size of dosage unit;
- Consolidated, established and entrenched trafficking networks;
- Broad geographic and sociological appeal in the United States;
- Sophistication in smuggling techniques.

The coca production and abuse and availability statistics all suggest a continuing increase in cocaine abuse in the United States. Those figures are supported by recent large-scale seizures, data released by the National Institute on Drug Abuse in March, and data recently acquired in Colombia.

The seizure of 3,800 pounds of cocaine in a cargo shipment at Miami on March 9 was followed by seizures of 1,200 pounds in Louisiana in May and over 600 pounds on Long Island in June. These unusually large shipments apparently are in addition to—rather than supplanting—the traditionally smaller shipments, suggesting a considerable increase in the total amount of cocaine shipped to the United States.

Data released by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) on March 9 show that the number of reported cocaine users in the United States more than doubled between 1977 and 1979. This coincides with data given above showing that cocaine-related admissions to federally funded drug clinics have tripled since 1977.

Difficulties in Cocaine Estimates

John Bacon
Chief, Strategic Cocaine Unit
Office of Intelligence

Although cocaine is one of the most widely abused drugs in the United States and diverts an enormous amount of money into the underground economy, the exact scope of the problem—or even a reasonable approximation—has so far eluded the collective estimative skills of government analysts.

Lacking a single convincing method of arriving at an estimate, analysts have been forced to fall back on juggling several different methods. These are as follows:

1. Coca leaf production;
2. Cocaine hydrochloride production;
3. Amount of cocaine in international traffic;
4. Cocaine consumption.

To arrive at the estimate of coca leaf production, analysts use this formula: Area planted times yield per unit of area, minus accountable licit consumption and loss, gives the maximum amount of leaf available for illicit conversion. Unfortunately, none of the elements making up the formula are known with any degree of accuracy. Estimates of the areas planted in Bolivia and Peru—the two main coca producers—vary widely, and in the rare instances where areas have been measured observation and laboratory analysis suggest widely varying yields. Further, lacking any data at all, analysts arbitrarily set loss (damage to crops, spoilage, loss in transit, etc.) at fifty percent of total estimated production.

The estimate of cocaine hydrochloride production has in the past depended on analysis of informant information and of seized cocaine laboratories. This estimate has, if anything, been even shakier than the crop production estimate. In future, however, a refinement may be possible. Data on the availability of cocaine predecessors—chemicals necessary for the production of cocaine—are at least partly available and should be invaluable in determining maximum amounts of cocaine that could be produced.

Once manufactured, the cocaine must be smuggled out of the producing area. Analysis of seizure data, informant debriefings, and captured records supply some data on the amount of cocaine in international traffic, although it is far from conclusive.

Consumption data would seem to provide, at first glance, the most promising method for estimating the extent of the cocaine problem in the United States. The following formula is applicable: Number of users times amount used equals total amount consumed. (Amount used is defined as frequency of use times average purity.) But, once more, data are lacking to provide a trustworthy estimate.

DEA recognizes the weaknesses of its estimative procedures but believes that with the information now available, and given the current state of the estimative art, we have done as well as is possible. Meanwhile, we hope to continue gathering information that will help to sharpen the estimate and to improve estimative techniques to make them more useful and more credible.

Cocaine Trafficking Trends in Europe

Reprinted from *Quarterly Intelligence Trends*, Summer 1982

Cocaine trafficking and abuse have become a serious problem for many European countries in recent years. From 1977 through 1981 the amount of cocaine seized in Europe increased almost fourfold (from 59 kilograms to 232 kilograms). Moreover, the number of seizure incidents more than doubled in 1981 compared to 1978 (98 versus 48).

Cocaine, long popular among the wealthier segments of society in Europe and the Middle East, has become in recent years increasingly available to other segments of society due to cheaper prices for cocaine and easier travel to and from source countries in South America. The region continues to play a dual role in the traffic in cocaine; it is a consumer area, and a transit point for cocaine destined for other parts of the world. Because of the increasing availability of cocaine and recent changes in trafficking patterns in Europe, a review of the more important aspects of the cocaine trafficking situation is given for 1980 and 1981. During these two years most the seizures took place in two major transit countries, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, and in the four primary recipient countries—Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.

France. Seizures in France rose by 150 percent from about 34 kilograms in 1980 to over 85 kilograms in 1981. During this two-year period France has been the primary point of entry to Europe used by traffickers in cocaine arriving via commercial airlines from South America. Almost all of the seizure incidents reported during the last two years were made at international airports servicing Paris. There was one incident at the Nice International Airport. Information resulting from the seizures made at the airports indicates that much of the cocaine was destined for countries other than France, such as Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States. The quarterly seizures peaked during the first quarter of 1981, and declined later in the year following the intense and successful law enforcement activities of the first quarter. France, however, is a convenient point of entry to Europe, and remains popular with cocaine traffickers.

Federal Republic of Germany. This country is used primarily as a transit point for cocaine destined usually for the Netherlands and Italy. Close to 37 kilograms (96 percent) of the more than 38 reported for the two-year period were seized at the international airport servicing Frankfurt in 15 incidents. The remaining seizures occurred in Berlin, Hamburg, Kleve and Munich. In one instance German authorities seized cocaine which had been smuggled into Hamburg by a South American crew member aboard an Ecuadorean vessel. This was the only

incident reported involving cocaine known to have been smuggled to Europe by vessel. The incident which occurred at Kleve involved a small amount of cocaine purchased in the Netherlands by two U.S. citizens residing in Germany.

Spain. Ranking second in the amount of cocaine seized during 1980 and 1981 but first in the number of seizures reported, Spain holds a dual position in the cocaine traffic. It is not only a primary recipient country for cocaine but also a transit country. Spain is used by cocaine traffickers who are often destined for the Netherlands and, more recently, for Italy. It is interesting to note that while cocaine traffickers destined for such countries as the Netherlands and Italy enter Europe via Spain, during the last two years there have been an increasing number of incidents in France or at the Franco-Spanish border involving traffickers destined for Spain.

Of the 55 seizure incidents, thirty (55 percent) were made at airports servicing Madrid, Barcelona, and Las Palmas in the Canary Islands. They accounted for about 48 kilograms of cocaine, divided fairly evenly (25 and 23 kilograms respectively) between 1980 and 1981. The remaining 25 seizures (45 percent) took place at locations other than airports, and included the only seizure of a clandestine cocaine laboratory in Europe during 1980. The decline in the seizure total for 1981 is related to the decrease in seizures at non-airport locations (which dropped to about eight kilograms from the 33 kilograms reported during 1980) brought on partially by very successful local enforcement efforts of previous years.

Italy. Seizures made at non-airport locations have been the dominant pattern, particularly during 1981 when less than two of the thirty kilograms seized were at an airport. Cocaine reaches Italy via several routes. A popular pattern involved Italian males who arrived in Paris from Lima and were destined for Italy. After successful French enforcement efforts targeted against Italians arriving from Lima, similar seizures began to occur at the airports servicing Frankfurt and Zurich. Recently, an Italian male, who arrived from Lima and was destined for Milan, was arrested at Las Palmas, Canary Islands. A second pattern in the traffic of cocaine to Italy involves Chileans who usually travel via France or Switzerland and are destined for Milan.

United Kingdom. A principal recipient country for cocaine in Europe, the United Kingdom is also to a lesser extent a transit country. Seizures at airports were about 18 kilograms in 1980, while seizures at non-airport locations were just over half that amount. Seizures at airports dropped by 58 percent from 1980 to 1981, compared with a 16 percent decline in seizures at non-airport locations for the two-year period. On at least two occasions, cocaine destined for India and the South Pacific transited the United Kingdom. Seizures of cocaine destined for other European countries have been made in the United Kingdom. The traffic in cocaine in the United Kingdom is apparently dominated by Britons, as opposed to the other recipient countries where other nationality groups have established themselves, e.g. Chileans in Italy and Colombians in Spain and the Netherlands.

The Netherlands. This is one of the four primary recipient countries in Europe. As with the other three, cocaine is intended for local consumption, or for redistribution to local markets elsewhere in Europe. Also, the Netherlands sometimes plays a secondary role as a transit country. Such was the case in 1981 when a group smuggling cocaine concealed in batteries via the Netherlands Antilles and the Netherlands to the United States was uncovered and immobilized. The 42 kilograms seized in the two-year period are divided fairly evenly between seizures at airports (20 kilograms) and at non-airport locations (22 kilograms). All of the seizures at airports, totaling four, took place in 1980. Traffickers in cocaine destined for the Netherlands have tended to avoid direct travel to that country from South America. They prefer circuitous routes which take them through one or more other European countries—often Spain, The Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Denmark. Seizures reported for the Netherlands dropped to four and one half kilograms for 1981—a decline of 88 percent. This sharp decline in seizures may be the result of the increased law enforcement efforts in European countries used as transit points by cocaine traffickers destined for the Netherlands, and of successes by Dutch authorities who, for example, seized the only clandestine cocaine laboratory in the region during 1981.



Switzerland, Belgium and Denmark are also emerging as important transit countries. The role of Switzerland, in particular, has increased as traffickers have shifted their patterns of travel. In two instances, Zurich was used as a transit point by smuggling groups which had previously used Paris. Switzerland has been used as a transit point mainly by traffickers destined for Italy. Belgium is often on the route of cocaine traffickers destined for the Netherlands. There are, however, no direct flights between countries in South America and Belgium. Traffickers usually arrive in Belgium via France or Germany. Finally, Denmark is gaining in popularity with cocaine traffickers destined for the Netherlands and for Italy.

Colombia:

South America's Cocaine Cornucopia

A Report by the
Strategic Cocaine Unit of the
DEA Office of Intelligence

For the past five years, Colombia has been one of the major illicit drug producers in the world. It dominates the supply of three principal illicit drugs, furnishing at least 50 percent of the cocaine, as much as 75 percent of the marihuana, and about 80 percent of the illicit methaqualone. The movement of these drugs to the U.S. market has increased dramatically in recent years, coinciding with an alarming rise in drug abuse and drug-related injuries.

Widespread abuse is only one of the problems. Cocaine and marihuana are the two top money-makers of the illicit drug trade, producing immense power which is used by trafficking groups to corrupt officials and to disrupt social and economic order in both producer and user countries. Violence accompanies the drug traffic in the United States, the Caribbean, and South America.

Colombia's dubious distinction as a principal drug source country may be attributed to its strategic location on the South American continent, its geographic makeup, and the ruthless tactics of an experienced, well-ordered trafficking community.

Cocaine Production and Trafficking

As both a processing center and a staging area for cocaine smuggling, Colombia is the principal source and major producer of cocaine hydrochloride worldwide. In 1980 Colombia may well have processed as much as 35 metric tons of cocaine; of this total, between 20 and 25 metric tons may have been successfully introduced into the United States. An analysis of worldwide seizures in 1980 indicates that Colombia was the source country for half of the cocaine seized and almost 30 percent of the seizure incidents. In cases where source countries have been identified, Colombia accounted for 70 percent of all cocaine seized in the United States.

There is no precise data regarding the extent of coca cultivation in Colombia. An estimated 3,000 hectares are planted in coca bushes which may produce 2,250 metric tons of coca leaf. Until recently Colombian leaf production was believed to have served a small indigenous population and did not enter the international cocaine traffic. A small and growing amount of coca leaf is now being cultivated for cocaine conversion purposes. Coca cultivation is expanding in the areas of Cauca, Putumayo, Narino, Meta, and Vaupes. Evidence of cocaine paste extraction laboratories at the growing sites further indicates that this expanded cultivation is grown strictly for the international trade. Although there are numerous non-alkaloid species of coca plants, leaf samples show that the alkaloid content of current Colombian cultivation is indeed sufficient to sustain cocaine conversion enterprises.

Colombia has a great potential for expanding its illicit coca production, and traffickers may do so to ensure a steady, economical supply of coca materials. Even if the land currently under cultivation were not expanded, production would still multiply as existing bushes mature.

The Colombian Government only recently began to focus on the problem of domestic coca production. Enforcement agencies have destroyed some individual fields and continue to do so; however, the government has not adopted a policy for dealing with illicit local coca production and is not currently considering an income substitution program for coca-producing areas. The impact of eradication programs could be significant since fields take several years to mature and represent considerable investments in time and labor. It is important for the government to act before coca cultivation and income become ingrained in the rural economy.

Although coca leaf production is increasing in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia continue to provide the bulk of the coca raw materials. Paste and base for processing into cocaine hydrochloride enter southern Colombia by land, air and water routes directly from Peru and Bolivia or through third countries. Coca derivatives are then shipped to laboratories near the larger cities, principally Bogota, Medellin, and Cali, where chemicals required to process cocaine are readily available.

Acetone and ether, chemicals considered essential to hydrochloride conversion, are in abundant supply in Colombia but are not produced there in quantity. The United States, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany are the principal suppliers to Colombia. Importation into Colombia is legal but far exceeds amounts required for legitimate industrial and commercial purposes.

Information has recently been collected on Colombia detailing imports of ether from 1978 through mid-1981. Ether is a necessary chemical in the production of cocaine. Analysis of the information indicates that well over 90 percent of the ether went to known or suspected sources of ether for cocaine traffickers. During that

three-and-a-half year period, 4,595 tons of ether were imported into Colombia. Using a conservative ratio of the ether needed to produce cocaine, half of that much ether could have produced 170 tons of cocaine or an annual average of 42.5 tons for the 1978-1981 period. Previously, it had been estimated that Colombia produced 50 percent or more of the world's cocaine.

Aside from their own formidable production, Colombian violators also purchase and organize the traffic in cocaine from other South American countries to the world market directly or through Colombia.

As the primary production and staging area for worldwide cocaine trafficking, Colombia's actions against the supply and traffic are critical to the reduction of availability worldwide.

- It is the most important buyer of illicit coca grown in Peru and Bolivia.
- It is the most prolific producer of cocaine hydrochloride.
- It has established organizations whose business skills and ruthlessness have monopolized the most advantageous production, transport, and marketing position in this profitable, competitive business.

Drug Abuse and Demand Reduction

Though drug abuse in Colombia is not perceived as a major problem by the government or the public, it is the consensus that an increased number of Colombian youth are indulging in marihuana, cocaine, and methaqualone abuse. A Justice Ministry-sponsored survey has shown that drug abuse among youth is much higher than was previously believed. The National Council on Dangerous Drugs, which is responsible for the review of all drug-related laws, resumed operation in March 1981 after almost two years of inactivity. It has initiated a program to reduce domestic demand for narcotics. In theory, the Council has responsibility for setting narcotics control policy in Colombia, but it has been reluctant to get involved in any aspect of narcotics control beyond reduction. Colombians are beginning to accept that marihuana is a dangerous drug. The new awareness and official concern over the domestic drug abuse problem is a change of attitude which might spur the government to more intense interdiction and eradication efforts.

Outlook

Cooperation between Colombian and American narcotics agencies continues to improve as well as among Colombian drug control organizations. Efforts to disrupt active trafficking organizations and routes are increasing, and the success of the enforcement agencies over the past year is partly responsible for a newborn awareness of the problem by the populace and government officials. The overall commitment is still influenced heavily by budget restrictions. In the past few years the public has been made aware of Colombia's importance in the international drug trade and has begun to realize that narcotics trafficking has a destabilizing effect on Colombian social and economic order.

After twenty years of relative political calm, Colombia faces several internal political and economic pressures which will influence the importance that a new administration will place on narcotics control: economic difficulties including an inflation rate of about 27 percent, intensified guerrilla and terrorist activities, and a growing rate of violent crime.

When President Julio Cesar Turbay-Ayala took office in August 1978, he pledged the Colombian Government to several multilateral cooperative interdiction and investigative operations aimed at international narcotics trafficking. There is no indication whether the successor government will continue Turbay's "implacable crusade" against narcotics trafficking.

Colombian Government Initiatives in Drug Control

The Government of Colombia has taken the following actions to increase its capability to control the production and trafficking in illicit drugs.

- A revised U.S.-Colombian Extradition Treaty has been signed and ratified by both countries. For the first time a civilian Colombian government has agreed to extradite its nationals under specific limited circumstances. The treaty was ratified by the U.S. Government in November 1981 and is expected to broaden U.S. and Colombian enforcement capabilities.
- The Colombian Government is studying a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty which provides for the exchange of information and evidence in criminal, civil, and administrative matters with the United States.
- In early 1981 the long-awaited Special Anti-Narcotics Units of the National Police became fully operational and were deployed in all active illicit drug regions. The 900-man organization replaced the army as Colombia's primary anti-narcotics agency.
- A full commitment to a herbicidal marihuana eradication program is pending, and no decision is likely until the new government takes office in August of 1982. Coca eradication, meanwhile, is gathering momentum and may establish a precedent for marihuana control.
- The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances was ratified by the Congress in December 1980 and signed by the President in January 1981. This action strengthens Colombia's position in curtailing methaqualone imports.

The Public Policy Response to the Complex Cocaine Issue

Lee I. Dogoloff
Executive Director
The American Council on Marijuana
and Other Psychoactive Drugs



Scientists and clinicians have clearly established that cocaine use is destructive to the health and well-being of individual users. When the drug is relatively easy to get, as it is today, people will both use it and, in many cases, experience problems as a result. There is ample evidence, both objective and anecdotal, to indicate that cocaine has become a serious problem in the United States.

The Federal Government surveys selected hospital emergency rooms to identify which drugs patients mention when they appear with drug-related problems. In 1973, cocaine was not even listed among the top 50 drugs on that survey. By 1978, cocaine ranked 29th, and by 1981 it was the 13th most frequently mentioned drug. The same annual study also contacts medical examiners, who in 1980 ranked cocaine eighth among substances specified as a cause of death. [Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN), National Institute on Drug Abuse.] The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee estimates that in 1980 approximately 44 metric tons of cocaine, with a retail value of $32 billion, were consumed in the United States. This figure nearly doubled the 1978 estimate.

Headlines such as "Cocaine Is Almost A Way Of Life In Hollywood" *(Dallas Times Herald*, March 14, 1982); "Cocaine Spreads Its Deadly Net" *(U.S. News and World Report*, March 22, 1982); "FBI Agent Seized on Cocaine-Sale Charges" (*The New York Times*, November 25, 1981), and "Cocaine And The Middle Class High" (*Reader's Digest*, October 1981, condensed from *Time*, July 6, 1981), are becoming all too familiar. While headlines do not always accurately depict reality, the fact that over four million people have used cocaine in the past month and that cocaine-related admissions to drug clinics were up 300 percent in the last five years (Kozel et al., 1982) confirm that the drug is not only gaining in popularity but causing serious problems as well. And just to set the record straight, this is not solely a "West Coast phenomenon." The New York State Division of Substance Abuse Services has announced a 122 percent increase in emergency room episodes, a three-fold (197 percent) increase in cocaine-related deaths, and substantial increases in admissions to treatment for cocaine use from 1979 to 1980. Denver and Washington, D.C., have also experienced substantial increases, and the number of emergencies continues to rise from a historically high level in Miami.

Today, few observers of the drug scene would deny that cocaine has become a significant health and social issue for our society; the dilemma lies in how to solve this problem. Normally, drug policy analysts look to the source of supply for answers. Cocaine originates in the mountainous regions of Peru and Bolivia where nearly all coca bush cultivation occurs. Ninety percent of this coca leaf production is for illicit purposes, with only ten percent used for domestic chewing, flavoring, and the manufacture of licit cocaine for medicinal purposes. Since it takes nearly four years for the coca bush to reach maturity and thereby produce its leaves for harvest, one obvious solution is to eliminate the plants. Although this sounds easy, there are several reasons why it is not likely to happen in the near future. Both Peru and Bolivia are "developing nations." Because they are poor, drug control has a lower budgetary priority than many other problems. Since the coca bush is cultivated in remote areas, many of which are accessible only by air, monitoring and eradication of the coca bush crop are both rather difficult. For these countries, where poverty and illiteracy are widespread, the funding of costly drug supply reduction efforts assumes less importance.

Nevertheless, in Peru the government views the illicit cultivation of coca as a serious threat to national security. There is also concern about the negative health and economic consequences felt by its people as a result of coca paste smoking. The United States is currently supporting the Peruvian Government's strong resolve to control coca production through a series of pilot projects aimed at crop eradication. Geography, terrain, and the absence of modern ground transportation networks, however, hinder these well-intentioned efforts.

Bolivia shares all Peru's problems but is just beginning to recognize the negative impact that illicit coca production is having on its nation's status within the international community. Although the government is making efforts to shut down the illegal cocaine manufacturing laboratories, negotiations are just beginning with the United States to formulate a crop eradication strategy.

However committed Peru and Bolivia are to eliminating illicit coca cultivation, given even the most optimistic scenario effective control is probably ten years away.

Since control at the source only holds promise for the long term, interrupting the cocaine traffic seems like the next logical step. Once harvested, the coca leaves are made into cocaine through a crude and simple manufacturing process. These

"Our stance with the media should be one that emphasizes responsibility, not censorship."

laboratories are found not only in the producing countries of Peru and Bolivia but also in Colombia, the major shipment point from which cocaine is sent to the United States and Europe.

Like the distribution system for marihuana, the cocaine network is broad and diverse. Both large and small shipments enter the United States by aircraft, boat, and human courier. Because the Caribbean is vast and the large coastline affords so many opportunities for illegal entry, interrupting the flow of cocaine into our country is extremely difficult. For example, government officials estimate that about ten percent of the total illicit drugs entering the United States are confiscated each year. Even if that figure could be raised to 50 percent, which is highly doubtful given the resources required to patrol our borders, the trafficking in cocaine would continue. The profits made in the cocaine trade are so enormous that a 50 percent loss still would not provide a financial disincentive to those involved in this lucrative "industry." Thus, a long-term strategy that relies on supply reduction through crop eradication or the interception of the drug either before or after it enters the United States cannot respond to our needs for a more immediate approach.

These realities leave us with little choice. Of necessity, the near-term resolution to the cocaine problem lies in somehow influencing the users' behavior, thereby reducing the demand for this most alluring of drugs.

Based on our experience with other drugs, the elements of a strategy to reduce the demand for cocaine seem to be fairly clear. First, as humanitarians, we must ensure that those individuals who are already experiencing problems with cocaine have treatment services available. Fortunately, although growing, this client population is relatively small and, unlike those dependent on heroin, better able to secure treatment without a major new investment of tax dollars.

Second, past experience dictates that research play a key role in this strategy. It is at this point that the issue starts to become cloudy. Research dollars are severely limited and cocaine is the drug of choice for a limited population. How can we justify the expenditures of scarce resources for this purpose?

From my own perspective, I believe that our experience with marihuana demonstrates the importance of scientific research into the so-called "pleasure drugs." Marihuana's unfounded reputation for safety led to enormous problems during the 1970's when "limited" research dollars were focused on heroin.

I am not disputing the tremendous value received from that investment, but believe that as policymakers we neglected marihuana far too long. Today, I think, there are some parallels with cocaine. I would urge a policy that endorses continued research into cocaine. However, research, by its very nature, is also a long-term proposition. What then can be done in the immediate future?

Changing attitudes is the one approach then that appears to hold the most promise in the short term. While not wanting to belabor the relationship with marihuana, from a policy perspective it is clear that this kind of prevention has succeeded in reducing a problem that was completely out of control less than five years ago.

To change attitudes about cocaine requires, first, a new message about cocaine's potential health hazards, and second, a commitment to broadcast that information widely. Both tasks are fraught with problems. Many messages already exist that glamorize cocaine. Not only will the prevention messages have to counter those well-established images, but it will have to convince Americans that some sources of pleasure *are* dangerous.

To communicate that idea may seem a mission impossible, yet in the interests of the public well-being it must be done. Because cocaine is the most reinforcing or pleasureable drug known, the potential for compulsive use exceeds that of virtually any other drug. When monkeys are offered unlimited amounts of cocaine, they will self-administer it to the exclusion of both food and sex, and finally die. When we link this understanding with the fact that the "at risk" population for cocaine is primarily young, adult males, the implications are serious. The notion of having a large segment of our young adult population impaired by cocaine at a time when many are embarking on career and family roles is unacceptable. Moreover, the fact that many habitual cocaine users devote vast sums of money to the pursuit of this drug, despite other responsibilities, is also cause for concern. The vignettes of the physician and the stockbroker in the recent "NBC White Paper on Pleasure Drugs" are illustrative of this point. I am convinced that if cocaine availability is increased and the price decreased, use will skyrocket. The tremendous potential for abuse, coupled with the destructive impact on careers and families, provide the impetus for a cocaine prevention policy.

As a first step toward influencing attitudes, we must encourage an *accurate* portrayal of cocaine. Our stance with the media should be one that emphasizes responsibility, not censorship. We need to convince the entertainment industry that it is in the public interest to refrain from portraying cocaine as chic and thereby inadvertently encouraging or sanctioning its use. At the same time that we ask the media to become more sensitive to this issue, we must assume responsibility for communicating the health facts about cocaine. I do not want to minimize the difficulties involved in persuading people that cocaine use is undesirable. To accomplish this, we must convince people that there is a relationship between use and abuse. The notion that "I can handle it—I'm going to use it occasionally and will stay in control" has lured many into using cocaine with disastrous results. The challenge to communicate a message that discourages cocaine use will take the creativity and dedication of both media and drug experts.

Preventing Cocaine Abuse

Parents from 20 states recently shared their concerns over adolescent drug use when the 35-member board of the National Federation of Parents for a Drug-Free Youth met with Mrs. Reagan in the White House.

John H. Langer
Chief, Preventive Programs Section
Drug Enforcement Administration

The prevention of drug abuse involves two approaches. The first is a general one. Prevention of abuse of dangerous drugs, those that are prohibited or controlled and either have no legitimate uses or very specific ones, is a long-range task of education and information. It is the responsibility of those who control drugs and supervise young persons. But there is no cut-off point at which one can say, "This is prevention, but these other activities are intervention or deterrence." In addition to a general effort against drug abuse, reducing cocaine abuse requires measures specific to the drug. These include accurate information on the drug itself, how it is abused, symptoms and effects, sources, illicit markets, and the likely target groups. A prognosis is needed for planning prevention strategies, selecting target audiences, and allocating resources. Finally, a general prevention and public education effort is basic to preventing any type of drug abuse.

Cocaine abuse in the United States has been increasing for the past 15 years. Despite the high cost of cocaine, there has been a steady rise in the rate of its consumption over the past five years, primarily among the affluent middle and upper income classes. Cocaine has been promoted by irresponsible "hyping" among media entertainment personalities, by misleading press reports about the harmlessness of "recreational" use, and by researchers and health professionals who misinterpret research findings and clinical observation. The damaging influence of the press and broadcast media in disseminating such misinformation can hardly be exaggerated. Although some responsible publications provide accurate information, many others treat the topic superficially and sensationally. Cocaine has become a "status" drug.

The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee report for 1980 verifies the "status drug" classification of cocaine. Although use among youths from 12 to 17 years old did not increase between 1979 and 1980, the 18-to-25 year age group showed an increase in the two preceeding years. That age group accounts for 60 percent of total cocaine used. The ratio of those who had ever used rose from 19.1 percent to 27.5 percent, those using in the past 12 months rose from 10.2 to 19.6 percent, and those using in the previous 30 days rose from 3.7 to 9.3 percent. These youths are either in college or out of school and are beyond the control of parents and other adults. Unless some specific measures aimed at reaching this group can be devised, or unless the supply of cocaine is cut substantially, this group can be expected to continue to abuse it. The prevention and education measures taken over the past decade that have shown their effectiveness in reducing marihuana use by high school seniors over the past three years cannot be used for these young adults. However, those same measures can be used to prevent those who will move into that age group in the next few years from being involved. This, together with the elimination of the present media and peer group pressures to abuse cocaine, can result in abuse reduction.

Cocaine has not yet been subjected to massive educational and prevention measures that have begun to reduce abuse of other drugs by school-age youth. The sub-headlines in the Washington Post reporting a recent study by Yale University researchers read: "Recreational Use Found No Riskier than Alcohol or Tobacco: Heavy Use Enslaving." Letters to the editor by Dr. William Pollin, Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, and by the authors protesting this characterization were not given similar visibility. The study, of course, implied no such safe pattern of cocaine abuse. Once again, the media misled the reader.

This careless handling of the facts by the media has had a major impact on society's perception of cocaine. Too many believe, wrongly, that the drug is harmless when used recreationally. Recent deaths and injuries to well-known entertainers have also been reported in the press, and to its credit it has reported accurately the effects of cocaine. Yet it is only the sensational stories about the drug, or the

spectacular seizures, which receive media attention. And its purpose in printing is not education but sensation. The Yale research pointed out that from 10 to 20 percent of "recfeational" users of cocaine do "become enslaved" and that it is impossible to predict who will be affected.

Another unusual aspect of cocaine dealing and abuse is that because it is a drug of the "well-to-do," most of whom are not involved in other street crimes, police cannot easily infiltrate or recruit informers. Dealers keep the same clientele, many refuse new customers, and even keep prices stable despite illicit market fluctuations.

The dilemma is a serious one. It is difficult to deter cocaine abuse when there is widespread belief that it is harmless if used only occasionally; when its use is encouraged as "chic" by popular entertainers and the media; when researchers and clinicians disagree on the effects of occasional use; when the largest abusing group is comprised of young adults out of school with money to spend; when it is easily available, dealing is done in a semi-protected middle-class milieu, and victims of the drug can usually take care of their own dysfunctions or be cared for by others.

On the positive side, cocaine is expensive, and making it even more expensive by reducing the supply is a first, essential step. This means more effective enforcement. It also, equally important, means greater efforts to reduce coca cultivation in South America, interdiction of supplies before they reach the United States, and confiscation of the assets of drug financiers to eliminate their economic power and thus their ability to finance large-scale smuggling operations. This is a function of federal and international agencies. Without this enforcement and deterrence, prevention and education programs will be unlikely to succeed in the foreseeable future.

The major task of helping parents and educators do their jobs must be supported by a major effort to eliminate the "glamorization" of cocaine by media and entertainment figures. The importance of the President and Mrs. Reagan's personal leadership in the prevention effort cannot be overestimated. This has stimulated, and will continue to encourage, the efforts of parents and others throughout the country who have long sought such support. Turning around entertainers whose smirking references to drug abuse have enraged parents is an important step in reducing easy acceptance of drug abuse. Many young persons have been tempted to experiment, ignoring their parents and peers, whose views are too often neutralized by prevailing media-projected attitudes.

A second important step is to continue to increase drug education as part of school health and safety curricula at all levels. Drug education seems, at last, to be showing results. Because it is a long-term process, it must be continued without letup or the opportunity to reach youth is lost forever.

State regulations and local school district policies and procedures need to be updated to deal with today's drug problems. Without a strong, well communicated and enforced policy for dealing with drug abuse in the schools, they will remain vulnerable and potential sanctuaries for drug sellers and users.

Parents' groups throughout the country have at last won the attention of educators and are insisting that drug abuse and related disruptive behavior be dealt with, not ignored, by the schools. Their efforts have shown results in the reduction of marihuana and a leveling-off of other abuse. School administrators and teachers need no longer feel isolated in their concern and can join parents and community groups in a concerted effort.

The third, and no less critical, need in prevention and education is marshaling of those in the community who have responsibility for youth. Parents' groups are making themselves heard, and many schools are cooperating. But these alliances are fragile and need strong support from the police, schools, civic groups, religious organizations and local business communities. Professional counseling and treatment programs will continue to be needed to help drug abusers. However, the strongest deterrent to drug abuse is a united community determined to eliminate drug dealing and drug abuse. Over the years a permissive attitude has evolved that has permitted the involvement of youth in drug abuse and eroded the quality of life in many neighborhoods. The "head shops" for a decade defied community values until public outrage was expressed and a Model State Law drafted by DEA passed constitutional muster and began to force their elimination.

But all the head shops are not gone, their wares are being carried by other stores, youth still gather before and after school to use drugs, the petty dealer still exploits his friends with marihuana, look-alike drugs, PCP, and even cocaine. In the big cities, heroin dealing continues in and around the schools. New York has 177,000 heroin addicts, according to the most recent study. The fight against drug abuse is far from over. Indeed it can never be over as long as drugs are available and the unscrupulous can exploit the naive and adventurous among our youth.

Youth, however, cannot be considered merely helpless victims. They have responsibilities to themselves, to their friends and families, and to the community. Our overprotective society has misled many into believing that they have somehow been immune from personal responsibility for their own mistakes. Too many 18-year-olds, facing adult justice for the first time, have said, "Why didn't someone tell me?"

Parents' organizations, by implication and by specific action, have begun to address that task. Parents, they say, must require of their children responsible decisions, and behavior. In extreme cases organizations such as "Tough Love" have been formed to help parents learn to control their children when they have gone beyond tolerable limits. Young people are learning to accept responsibility for their own actions before the criminal justice system becomes involved. That, in the last analysis, is basic education for adulthood and citizenship.

The grassroots movement against drug abuse, spearheaded by over 3,000 organizations of parents, is the most promising and potentially effective drug abuse prevention effort mounted in the past decade. It has been supported by DEA, by NIDA, by two successive administrations in the White House, and it has grown into an important factor in the national prevention effort. These organizations have concentrated their efforts on marihuana, because that is the major drug of abuse among young children, and one of the "gateway" drugs that involves youth in drug abuse and the drug subculture. However, the increase in cocaine abuse has not escaped notice, and the appearance of another drug among the many already menacing our communities should be sufficient to stimulate action.

Drug Enforcement

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A New Alliance

(Continued from inside front cover)

organized crime families and violence-prone, non-traditional criminal groups (i.e., outlaw motorcycle gangs), and in white-collar investigations, such as those involving public corruption or financial investigations.

We are convinced that our 1,200 accounting-trained Agents can add a new dimension to drug enforcement investigations. They will make significant contributions to financial investigations and will enhance asset-seizure efforts. This will permit us to take some of the profit out of drug trafficking and add to the risks of this trade.

But manpower is not the only thing that we bring to the battle. We bring additional tools such as the Organized Crime Information System (OCIS), a computer system which enables us to retrieve, organize and analyze information developed in organized crime investigations.

We use another system known as the Investigative Support Information System (ISIS) to organize and track the enormous amounts of information collected by our Agents in maior investigations. As an example, during our investigation into the assassination of Judge John Wood in San Antonio, Texas, we conducted over 6,000 interviews. ISIS was invaluable in our efforts to manage this investigation which included over 200,000 references.

Some of our tools and techniques are not new to DEA. But long-term undercover operations and court-authorized electronic surveillance are labor intensive techniques which are essential if we are to reach beyond the streets to those who finance and control drug trafficking. We have the human resources, the technology and the experience to engage in these activities and to do so in many areas at the same time.

Case statistics do not tell the entire story, but they are an indication of our dedication to drug enforcement. Since last July, FBI narcotics investigations have grown from 100 to over 800 and joint FBI/DEA investigations have increased from a handful to about 200.

Our new relationship is not the final answer to the drug problem, but it will be a major step in this nation's quest for solutions to this problem – a problem which is simply too complex not to be attacked on many fronts.

In the courtyard of FBI Headquarters in Washington there is an inscription on the wall. It reads: *"The most effective weapon against crime is cooperation...the efforts of all law enforcement with the support and understanding of the American people."*

That thought has never been more important than it is today. The FBI and DEA must lock arms in a true alliance and step out together to lead in the efforts to solve our country's most difficult and important crime problem. Because effective law enforcement is the twin brother of national security, we cannot, we must not, and we will not fail.

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"I Know We Can Win This Battle"

Mrs. Ronald Reagan is introduced by Mr. Don Kendall, president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.